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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Is the lower court's distribution of property and allocation 
of debts equitable? Do the court's findings support such an 
award? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts are accorded considerable discretion m 
determining the financial interests of divorced parties. But, 
though such determinations are entitled to a presumption of 
validity, they will not be affirmed if it is determined that the 
trial court abused its discretion. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah App. 1993) . Ultimately, the appellate court will modify a 
trial court's property and debt distribution NVonly if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion/' Watson 
v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial 
'issue No. 1 of this brief combines Issue No. 1 and Issue 
No. 2 from the docketing statement. 
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motions. (R. 507-527; R. 189, p. 16-24) 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Was it proper for the trial court to amend the—bindings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in the instant matter beyond the 
request in Petitioner's "Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law/' filed on May 6, 1999, and are said findings 
supported by the evidence and consistent with prior findings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
somewhat lesser burden of proof for reversing a judge's findings 
is borne by demonstrating that they are "against the clear weight 
of the evidence". Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). 
Furthermore, whether the judge could enter additional findings is 
a question of law, which is given no special deference. 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). Rule 52(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the determinative rule on 
the issue of amending findings of fact. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in post trial motions. (R. 507-
527; R. 554, p. 5-10) 
ISSUE NO. 3 
Did the lower court accurately set forth the separate 
property? Were there any extraordinary circumstances justifying 
the inclusion of premarital separate property as part of the 
marital estate? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The lower court has considerable discretion in determining 
the financial interests of divorced parties. But, JLhough such 
determinations are entitled to a presumption of validity, they 
will not be affirmed if it is determined that the trial court 
abused its discretion. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 
1993). The lower court abuses its discretion when it fails to 
enter specific, detailed findings supporting its financial 
determinations antf findings are adequate only if they are 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on each 
factual issue was reached. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue w^s preserved in oral argument and in post trial 
motions. (R. 507-527; R. 554, p. 5-10; R. 189, p. 16-24) 
ISSUE NO. 4 
Did the lowe^ court fail to properly amend its findings 
pursuant to the Respondent's request in her "Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact ^nd Conclusions of Law and Amendment to Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law," entered on or about December 1, 
1999? As left unamended, are the lower court's findings 
supported by the Evidence and consistent with the court's prior 
findings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court could subsequently enter additional 
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findings however, is a question of law, which is given no special 
deference. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
The issue was preserved at trial and in post trial motions. 
(R. 507-527; R. 554, p. 5-10; R. 189 p 16-24) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1995); See Addendum @ A. 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996); See Addendum @ A. 3. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 52; See Addendum @ 4. 
The complete texts of the above statutes and rule appear in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent and Petitioner have been married and divorced on 
four separate occasions, to-wit: 
a. Married September 22, 1989 - divorced February 25, 1993; 
b. Married April 26, 1993 - divorced on July 1, 1994; 
c. Married November 24, 1994 - divorced May 19, 1995; and 
d. Married August 4, 1995 - separated in early May 1998 -
divorced pursuant to a bifurcated decree in the pending matter on 
March 4, 1999. 
Respondent was awarded as her premarital real property, a 
home, in each of the three previous divorce decrees. 
During the parties' third marriage, Respondent sold her 
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premarital home and purchased a lot in Diamond Valley, State of 
Utah, where she built a home with the proceeds from the sale of 
the first home. Though the parties made some improvements to the 
Diamond Valley home during the third marriage, the Diamond Valley 
home was awarded to Respondent in the third divorce decree. 
After their fourth remarriage, the parties resided in 
Respondent's Diamond Valley home and again some improvements were 
made to the same. Additionally, during the fourth marriage, the 
Respondent refinanced her home twice with the resulting proceeds 
of approximately $100,000 being deposited into Respondent's 
separate bank account. These refinanced obligations increased 
Respondent's Diamond Valley mortgage structure from $30,000, upon 
Respondent's fourth marriage, to more than $140,000 at the time 
of the fourth separation and divorce. 
Respondent used the refinancing proceeds to purchase two 
more lots individually in her name, both located in Washington 
County State of Utah: Lot 127 in Winchester Hills and Lot 19 in 
Diamond Valley. The balance of the proceeds retired Respondent's 
premarital credit card debt and retired Petitioner's premarital 
debt on his premarital 1993 Ford pickup. Finally, Respondent 
purchased a saddle, a wood stove, tools and a 1989 Dually pickup. 
The parties both worked during this marriage, Petitioner in 
his premarital construction business, Respondent providing day 
care, performing the household duties, and working with the 
Petitioner in his construction business. 
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As a condition precedent to Respondent obtaining a 
construction loan from Mountain America Credit Union in April of 
1998, she quit claimed, absent consideration, the Winchester 
Hills Lot 127 and Diamond Valley Lot 19 to herself and 
Petitioner. Less than a month later, the parties separated. 
The lower court awarded Respondent her home and Diamond 
Valley Lot 19 as premarital, together with certain marital assets 
with a value of $9,500. Respondent also kept the entirety of the 
twice refinanced $140,000 mortgage on her premarital home, as 
well as credit card obligations of approximately $5,150. The 
lower court awarded Petitioner certain marital assets with a 
value of $69,200, including lot 127 in Winchester Hills, and 
allocated $11,000 of the marital obligation to Petitioner. 
This distribution of assets and allocation of debt provided 
Respondent additional marital assets of $9,500 juxtaposed with 
newly incurred obligations on the Respondent's premarital home in 
the amount of $77,1002 and the credit card obligations of $5,150. 
Petitioner, however received the lot in Winchester Hills and 
other martial assets totaling $69,2003 subject to his retiring 
2The $77,100 marital obligation is arrived at by taking the 
mortgage obligation of $140,000 and reducing the same by the 
$30,000 premarital obligation, the $3,000 of premarital credit 
card obligations of the Respondent that was paid by the 
refinancings, and the $29,900 paid for the Diamond Valley Lot 19 
because it was awarded to the Respondent as a premarital asset so 
it is appropriate that the obligation be deemed Respondent's 
separate debt. 
3The Respondent would add to the Petitioner's marital asset 
award the $1,200 paid towards the purchase of the saddle which 
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the Mountain America construction loan of $11,000. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner filed the divorce complaint on May 20, 1998 (R. 
002). A Bifurcated Decree was entered on March 4, 1999 (R. 378). 
Trial was conducted on December 17, 1998, for the bifurcation (R. 
187) and on February 4, 1999 for all other issues (R. 192). 
The court's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" were 
entered on April 19, 1999 (R. 395). On May 6, 1999, Petitioner 
filed his "Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law" (R. 433) and "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law" (R. 435). On May 19, 1999 Respondent filed her "Motion for 
a New Trial and Supporting Memoranda" (R. 450). By "Ruling" 
dated October 15, 1999, Petitioner's motion was granted in part 
and denied in part; Respondent's motion was denied (R. 487). The 
lower court also entered an "Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" on October 15, 1999 (R. 483) and on November 
16, 1999, a "Supplemental Decree of Divorce." 
The Respondent then filed her "Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" (R. 505), and a "Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" on December 
1, 1999 (R. 507). The court entered an "Order" on May 1, 2000 
would leave the Respondent with marital assets of $70,400. 
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which immaterially granted Respondent's motion in part and denied 
it in part (R. 560). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on May 31, 2000 (R. 565). 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The trial court ordered that the findings and conclusions 
entered April 19, 1999, be modified by the amended findings and 
conclusions entered on October 15, 1999, the supplemental decree 
entered on November 16, 1999, and again by the order entered on 
May 1, 2000. The trial court awarded the assets and allocated 
the debts of the parties as hereinbefore set forth. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on August 4, 1995 in Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming. The parties had been married and divorced on three 
prior occasions. Previous decrees appear in the record as 
Exhibits 1, 2 and 4. (R. 197-199, 200-204, and 395-397 
respectively) In summary, the prior decrees provide as follows: 
a. Married September 22, 1989, Divorced February 25, 1993; 
the case was filed in Utah and resolved by written stipulation; 
both parties received their personal property and Respondent 
herein received the real property. (R. 197-199) 
b. Married April 26, 1993, Divorced July 1, 1994; the case 
was filed in Idaho and was resolved by Respondent's default; both 
parties received personal property and Respondent received the 
real property. (R. 200-204) 
c. Married November 24, 1994, Divorced May 19, 1995; the 
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case was filed in Utah with Respondent using the "Quick-Court 
Kiosk" system. The case was resolved by Petitionee executing a 
waiver and consent; the decree provided that there were no newly 
acquired marital assets to be divided. (R. 207-210) The lower 
court correctly found that the third decree of divorce was res 
judicata as to Petitioner's assertions that he was entitled to an 
award of assets based upon home improvements that were made prior 
to the third divorce on May 19, 1995. (R. 395-397)4 
The parties resided in the Respondent's premarital home 
during the fourth marriage and made certain improvements. (R. 
189, p. 17 11. 24-25) Petitioner claimed that said improvements 
were performed only by him and that the cost for time and 
material of the work performed was $17,567. (R. 254; R. 189, p. 
8 11. 16-24) Petitioner also claimed that he contributed 
financially to the household and produced Exhibit 19, pp. 1-5, in 
support of his claim (R. 189, p. 11 11. 2-6; R. 257-61) 
Petitioner further claimed, through the introduction of Exhibit 
19, pp. 7-8, that he paid $18,806.53 towards Respondent's home in 
the form of supplies, taxes, and mortgage payments. (R. 262-263; 
R. 189, p. 9 11. 17-19; R. 189, p. 12 11. 12-20) 
Respondent introduced evidence that she and her son-in-law, 
4The Petitioner produced Exhibit 3 to support his claim that 
improvements were made prior to this marriage for which he sought 
compensation. (R. 204) Not only is the claim not valid due to 
the May 19, 1995 divorce decree and the trial court's res 
judicata finding, but Exhibits 3 and 26 are conclusive evidence 
that the Petitioner was already paid for the premarital 
improvements that he did make. (R. 205-206, and 290) 
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Ken Thornock, assisted in constructing the improvements allegedly 
constructed solely by the Petitioner. (R. 189, p. 20 11. 10-13; 
R. 189, p. 33 11. 6-13) Respondent also claimed that she either 
paid for the materials used or that the parties salvaged the 
materials from other construction jobs, or, in the case of rock 
and gravel, retrieved the material from the hills. (R. 189, p. 
20 11. 13-24, p. 18, 11. 10-12) 
The evidence at trial was undisputed with regard to the 
premarital assets and obligations that each party had at the time 
of this, their fourth marriage, as follows: 
a. Petitioner: At the time of the fourth marriage, 
Petitioner had a 1993 Ford Pickup with a value of $5,500.00 and 
an obligation against it in the approximate amount of $9,000.00 
(negative equity of $3,500.00) (R. 189, p. 17 11. 11-12); his 
construction tools (no value placed) (R. 189, p. 17 11. 14-16); 
his personal property (no value placed) (R. 189, p. 17 11. 14-
16); and an IRS tax obligation in the amount of $43,329 58 as of 
November 16, 1998, plus accruing interest (R. 350; R. 189, p. 17, 
1. 11). Therefore, Petitioner had a net worth of a negative 
$46,829.58 (R. 189, p. 17 11. 10-11). 
b. Respondent: At the time of the fourth marriage 
Respondent had her home m Diamond Valley which was appraised in 
November of 1995 at a value of $164,000 (R. 211, p 2; R. 189, p. 
17 11. 4-7), with a long term obligation against it in the amount 
of $30,000.00, with monthly payments on said obligation being 
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$369.95 (R. 281 & 287; R. 189, p. 17 11. 5-7); a Corvette with a 
value of $8,000.00 (R. 189, p. 19 1. 21); a 1991 Chrysler (no 
value placed); her personal property (no value placed); and 
furnishings (no value placed) (R. 483, p. 2); and credit card 
obligations of approximately $3,000. Respondent, therefore, had 
a net worth of $139,000.00. 
The evidence was also undisputed at trial that the following 
assets were purchased during the marriage: (1) a saddle worth 
$2,000, purchased for $1,200 (R. 189, p. 23 1. 25 to p. 24 1. 1; 
R. 189, p. 41 11. 9-15; p. 42 1. 24 to p. 43 1. 10; R. 373); (2) 
a television for $300 (R. 189, p. 23 11- 14"-17); (3) a wood 
burning stove for $1,200 (R. 189, p. 23 11. 14-17); (4) a 1989 
Ford Dually Pickup for $9,500 (R. 189, p. 22 11. 8-10; R. 320; R. 
321); (5) Diamond Valley Lot 19 for $29,900 (R. 306-307, 308-316, 
317-318); (6) Winchester Hills Lot 127 for $39,000 (R. 293-305); 
(7) at least $6,967.75 of tools (R. 291; R. 189 p. 22 1. 25 to p. 
23 1. 3); (8) a 1985 Ford Pickup (R. 255); and (9) a 1994 Mercury 
Topaz (R. 255). 
The evidence is undisputed that Respondent refinanced her 
premarital home in November 1995 (R. 238-239) and again in 
December 1997 (.R. 24Q-241\ . This increased the obLiqatiou Q U her 
premarital marital home from $30,000 (R. 280) to $140,000. (R. 
280; 240; R. 189, p. 16 11. 21-24) 
The first refinancing was in the Respondent's name only (R. 
189, p- 6 11. 11-16) and the proceeds of $44,660.34 were placed 
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into Respondent's bank account. (R. 238, 291) Respondent used 
the proceeds in part to make down payments on Winchester Hills 
Lot 127 (R. 291-292; R. 293-305) and Diamond Valley Lot 19 (R. 
291-292; R. 299, 306-307, 308-316, 317-318) and both lots were 
conveyed to Respondent only. (R. 299, 317) Respondent then used 
the remaining proceeds as set forth in Exhibit 27. (R. 291) 
Respondent paid $6,967.75 for tools, $6,371.86 to pay off the 
Petitioner's premarital obligation on his 1993 Ford pickup, 
$1,651 to Gary Jones for assistance to Petitioner in resolving 
his premarital IRS obligation, and $1,900 cash directly to 
Petitioner. Respondent also retired her premarital credit card 
obligations, and paid $1,200 to purchase a saddle from the 
Petitioner's father, Grant Bowen (R. 291).5 
In December of 1997, Respondent again refinanced her 
premarital home, this time for $140,000. (R. 189, p. 6 11. 11-
16) Respondent obtained $55,296.51 in new cash proceeds which 
she deposited into her bank account. (R. 240, 319) Respondent 
The total of the amounts paid out in Exhibit 27 from the 
first refinance is $46,763.45, or $2,103.11 more than the amount 
received from the refinancing. (R. 291) The difference is 
simply made up of funds that Respondent had in her account and/or 
deposited into her account during the time period that the 
proceeds were being spent. Incongruously, the court ultimately 
determined that the Winchester Hills Lot 127 was a marital asset 
and awarded the same to the Petitioner (R. 483- 485, 498-500); 
that the saddle was a premarital asset of the Petitioner's (R. 
493-495, 498-500); and that all the tools were the premarital 
assets of the Petitioner's (R. 483-485, 498-500). Further, the 
court awarded the Petitioner's 1993 Ford pickup to him as a 
marital asset despite the fact that the same was upside down when 
the loan was paid off (R. 483-485, 498-500) 
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then used these proceeds to pay obligations on Winchester Hills 
Lot lil (R. 292, 293-305) and Diamond Valley Lot 19 (R. 292, 306-
307, 308-316, 317-318). She also purchased a 1989 Ford Dually 
Pickup (R. 292, 320, 321; R. 189, p. 22 11. 8-10), paid off 
marital credit card obligations that had accrued since the first 
refinancing (R. 292), and finally purchased a wood burning stove. 
(R. 292; R. 189, p. 23 11. 14-17)6 
I|n April of 1997, Respondent sought a construction loan to 
build a spec house on Diamond Valley Lot 19. Her application was 
initially denied. The mortgage lender, however, indicated that 
if the two lots were titled in both Petitioner and Respondent's 
name and Petitioner was included in Respondent's application, 
then the loan could be obtained. (R. 189, p. 6 1. 15 to p. 7 1. 
1; R. 189, p. 16 1. 25 to p. 17 1. 2) Respondent submitted a new 
loan application, (R. 323-325) and quit claimed both lots into 
the parties names on April 17, 1998. (R. 252) Consequently, the 
loan was approved and partially funded. (R. 245) 
Petitioner owned his own construction company, Interwest 
6The total of the amounts paid out in Exhibit 27 from the 
second refinance is $59,804.62, or $4,508.11 more than the amount 
received from the refinancing. (R. 292). The difference, again, 
is made up of funds the Respondent had in her account or 
deposited into her account during the time period that the 
proceeds were being spent. The court awarded the Winchester 
Hills Lot 127 to the Petitioner as a marital asset, the Diamond 
Valley Lot 19 to the Respondent as a premarital asset, and the 
wood burning stove to the Petitioner as a premarital asset (R. 
483-485, 498-500). However, the court later determined that the 
wood burning stove was a marital asset but still awarded the same 
to the Petitioner (R. 560-561). (See also R. 189, p. 20 11. 1-7) 
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Home Works. Petitioner's gross and net incomes from his 
construction work during the marriage were $15,617.56 and 
$5,077.85, respectively, in 1995 (R. 224 and 226), -$4 3,091.67 and 
$4,761.96, respectively, in 1996 (R. 228 and 230), and $32,784 
and $12,461, respectively, in 1997. (R. 233 and 235) 
Respondent, simultaneously, received child support (R. 189, 
p. 19 11. 1-18), and additional income as a day care provider 
working through Human Services (R. 233, 1. 21). Respondent also 
used student loan monies acquired during the marriage for 
household expenses (R. 189, p. 19, 11. 18-21) and sold premarital 
assets (including a valuable car) using the proceeds for 
household expenses. (R. 189, p. 19 11. 1-3 & 21-22) Respondent 
assisted the Petitioner in his construction business. (R. 189, 
p. 29 11. 1-2; R. 323) Respondent also contributed to the union 
by doing all of the household chores which allowed Petitioner to 
focus on his business and increased Petitioner's gross receipts 
from $30,087 in 1995 (R. 226) to $50,563 in 1996 (R. 230) and 
$78,925 in 1997 (R. 235). (R. 189, p. 28 1. 11 to p. 29 1. 7) 
The parties separated in May of 1998 with Petitioner soon 
filing for divorce on May 20. (R. 002) Petitioner requested at 
trial that all the parties assets and debts be as marital, with 
the exception of his premarital IRS obligation, and proposed a 
division pursuant to his Exhibit 17. (R. 255; R. 189, p. 12 11. 
21-25, p. 13 11. 10-13) This distribution would have awarded the 
Petitioner $102,300 of assets and $16,210 of debt for a net of 
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$86,090. Respondent would have received $233,605 in assets and 
$146,125 of debt for a net of $87,480, iLj_e., the routine long 
term marital distribution of assets and allocation xxL debts. 
A^ter trial, the lower court, in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered on April 19, 1999, embracing 
Petitioner's claim that all assets and obligations should be 
deemed marital and be equally divided, found all to be marital 
assets and liabilities and distributed the same as follows: 
To Petitioner: Winchester Hills Lot 127 $ 55,000.00 
1989 Ford Dually Truck $ 9,500.00 
1993 Ford Pickup $ 3,500.00 
Tools $ 16,800.007 
Saddle $ 2,000.00 
Mountain America Visa Debt $ (1,200.00) 
Advanta Credit Card Debt $ (1,450.00) 
Chase Manhattan Visa Debt $ (2,500.00) 
Net Total $ 81,090.00 
To Respondent: Diamond Valley Lot 19 $ 45,000.00 
1985 Ford Pickup $ 3,500.00 
1994 Ford Mercury $ 3,000.00 
Furniture $ 5,000.00 
Wood Stove $ 1,200.00 
Television $ 600.00 
Personal Property $ 5,505.008 
Student Loan Debt $ (6,125.00) 
Net Total $ 57,680.00 
(R. 397-398). The court awarded the Respondent her premarital 
7It is undisputed that approximately $8,000 of tools were 
purchased during the marriage that are set forth as the 
Petitioner's premarital assets. (R. 189, p. 22 1. 25 to p. 23 1 
1; R. 2 91; R. 345). 
8The $5,505 is the amount of Petitioner's personal 
property he claimed the Respondent had but would not return, 
The breakdown of the same is set forth on Petitioner's 
Exhibit 18. (R. 256). 
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home9 encumbered by the entirety of the twice refinanced 
obligation thereon. (R. 398, fll) The lower court failed to make 
a finding as to the construction loan with Mountain America of 
approximately $11,000, secured by both lots, specifically found 
that there was no evidence that supported a finding that the 
Petitioner's IRS debt would affect the dissolution and therefore 
made no finding as to its character or who would pay for it. 
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Memorandum on May 6, 1999, requesting that 
the court allocate the $11,000 obligation to Mountain America 
Credit Union to Respondent and additionally award the Petitioner 
$1,500 for damage to the 1989 Ford Dually.10 (R. 433-440) 
Respondent filed a Motion for a New Trial and Supporting 
Memorandum on May 19, 1999 (R. 450-454). On October 15, 1999, 
the court entered a Ruling (R. 487-495) and Amendment to Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 483-486), separating marital 
from premarital property and awarding the same as follows: 
Petitioner's premarital: 
1990 Utility Trailer 
Army Trailer 
First Security Bank Checking Account 
Tools listed in Exhibit A of Complaint 
Antique Farm Equipment 
9The trial court has never made a finding as to the 
value of the Respondent's premarital home. 
10The Petitioner pursued this despite claiming at the 
time of trial that he was waiving any claim for the alleged 
damage to the seats of the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup. (R. 






Mountain America Checking Account 
Mountain America Credit Card Debt 
Advanta Credit Card Debt 




Diamond Valley Lot and Home11 
Household Furnishings, Appl. & Equip. 
Petitioner's marital: 
Winchester Hills Lot 127 $ 55,000.00 
1989 Ford Dually Truck $ 9,500.00 
1993 Ford Pickup $ 3,500.00 
Mtn. Am. Const. Loan $(11,000.00) 
Net Total $ 57,000.00 
Respondent's marital: 
1985 Ford Pickup $ 3,500.00 
1994 Ford Mercury $ 6,000.00 
Net Total $ 9,500.00 
(R. 484-485) The newly financed obligation on the Respondent's 
premarital home was allocated solely to Respondent pursuant to 
paragraph 11 of the initial findings. (R. 398, Sill) 
Assuming nothing else but the marital distribution above, 
the trial court awarded Petitioner 86% ($57,000/$66,500) of the 
combined marital estate and Respondent only 14%. The trial court 
also burdened Respondent with an additional $110,000 of post 
nThe trial court has never made a finding as to the value of 
the Respondent's premarital home. 
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marital obligations secured solely by her premarital home. Thus, 
Respondent's original note at the time of marriage in the amount 
of $30,000, payable at the rate of $369.95 per month, with an 
interest rate fixed at 8.375% (R. 280) had become a note in the 
amount of $140,000, payable at the rate of $1,289.77 per month, 
with a variable interest rate.12 (R. 240, 323-325) 
Respondent then filed a motion to amend the court's initial 
and amended findings and memorandum in support thereof on 
December 1, 1999. Respondent reguested therein that the 
character of the Chase Manhattan Credit Card Debt, the Advanta 
Credit Card Debt and the Mountain America Credit Card Debt be 
changed from premarital obligations of Respondent to marital 
obligations as the same were clearly incurred during the 
marriage. Respondent then requested that these credit card 
obligations should be allocated to Petitioner as he alone had 
benefitted from these monies. Respondent further requested that 
the wood stove, Winchester Hills Lot 127, 1989 Ford Dually, and 
the 1993 Ford Pickup be awarded to her as her separate property 
because they were purchased directly from loan proceeds derived 
from the premarital home on which loan she was now wholly 
obligated. Alternatively, Respondent requested that a portion of 
the mortgage equal to the purchase price of these assets be 
pThe only benefits the Respondent received from the 
increased obligation was the purchase of the Diamond Valley Lot 
19 (purchased for $29,900) and the premarital credit card 
obligation being paid off in the approximate amount of $3,000. 
The result was the Respondent paying $77,100 of marital debt. 
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equitably allocated to Petitioner. (R. 507-527) 
The court denied Respondent's motion in all respects except 
to change the character of the wood sto^e from Petitioner's 
premarital asset to a marital asset, still awarding the wood 
stove to Petitioner. (R. 560-563) Thus, the marital asset 
allocation was readjusted with $58,200 to Petitioner and $9,500 
to Respondent with an even more inequitable result. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue No. 1 
The award of property and allocation of debts by the trial 
court is not equitable because the Petitioner was awarded 88% of 
the assets purchased during the marriage and only !£>% of the 
newly obtained marital obligations. Conversely, Respondent was 
awarded only 12% of the assets purchased during the marriage and 
90% of the additional obligations incurred during the marriage. 
There was no evidence of extraordinary circumstances, 
whethet the evidence before the trial court was deemed 
exceptional circumstances, contribution, commingling or 
enhancement that supports the current distributions inequities. 
Issue No. 2 
petitioner filed a motion to araend and requested that the 
court allocate the $11,000 Mountain America construction loan to 
Respondent and to award Petitioner $1,500 as damages to the 1989 
Ford Dually Pickup. At the same time, Respondent had a pending 
motion for new trial alleging that the lower court had not 
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properly determined what assets or obligations were separate 
property as required under Utah law. The trial court's 
resolution of these motions amended the original findings of fact 
and conclusions of law beyond Petitioner's request, and, absent 
any evidentiary support, contrary to Rule 52(a), URCP. 
Issue No. 3 
The lower court found the saddle to be Petitioner's 
premarital asset, but the undisputed evidence is that Respondent 
purchased the saddle from her first refinance loan proceeds 
during the marriage for $1,200. The lower court also found the 
Winchester Hills Lot 127, the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup, the 1993 
Ford Pickup, and the wood stove to be marital assets despite the 
undisputed evidence that the same were purchased directly from 
the refinancing proceeds traced from Respondent's premarital 
home. Oxymoronically, the increased mortgage on Respondent's 
premarital home was solely allocated to Respondent. Respondent 
either seeks the award of those assets purchased as her separate 
property, or, in the alternative, if the same are to remain 
marital, that the corresponding increased obligation on 
Respondent's concededly premarital home should be similarly found 
to be marital and equitably divided. The Court also declined to 
make findings regarding Petitioner's premarital IRS obligation, 
despite the undisputed evidence and the Petitioner's willingness 
to accept the IRS debt as his premarital obligation. 
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Issue No. 4 
Upon motion by Respondent, the trial court failed to amend 
its findings as to the following, despite the undisputed evidence 
or the substantial weight of the evidence being to the contrary: 
(1) the trial court left the Chase Credit Card debt, Advanta 
Credit Card debt, and the Mountain America Credit Card debt as 
characterized Respondent's premarital obligations; and (2) the 
trial court left the Winchester Hills Lot 127, the 1989 Ford 
Dually Pickup and the 1993 Ford Pickup as marital assets, changed 
the wood stove to a marital asset and awarded all of them to 
Petitioner yet allocated the corresponding loan undertaken on 
Respondent's home to buy these items entirely to Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1 
THE COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
AND DEBTS IS INEQUITABLE 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) provides that NN[w]hen a 
decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts, or 
obligations of the parties." Such allocation should occur so 
that the "ultimate division be equitable - that property be 
fairly divided between the parties, given their contributions 
during the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the 
divorce." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) 
Marital distribution must achieve a fair, just and equitable 
result. Dunn v. Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990); and Burke 
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v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, (Utah 1987) 
In response to the above mandate, Utah courts have 
established a systematic approach in analyzing assets by first 
categorizing whether the asset is marital or separate, with a 
coterminous presumption that each party is entitled to all their 
separate property and one-half of the marital property. 
Adjustments or unequal distributions of marital assets are to be 
made only where there exists a significant compensating factor 
that would justify the same. See Dunn v. Dunn 802 P.2d 1314, 
1323 (Utah App. 1990) and Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 
App. 1990); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991); 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992). In such event, 
the court should then consider the existence of exceptional 
circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed to effect an 
equitable distribution in light of those circumstances." Burt v. 
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Ut. App. 1993); Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1022 (Ut. App. 1993). An unequal distribution of the 
marital property must be accompanied by findings justifying the 
decision. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022. The factors the 
courts look at in determining a fair, just, and equitable result 
are set forth in Dunn, at 1322 and Burke, at 135 supra. 
In this case the trial court did not distribute the marital 
assets and obligations equitably and/or pursuant to the 
presumption that each party should be entitled to fifty percent 
of the martial assets. 
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The final award of property and allocation of debts by the 
lower court awarded Petitioner 88% of the marital assets (i.e. 
Winchester Hills Lot 127 - $55,000; 1989 Ford Dually Truck -
$9,500; 1993 Ford Pickup - $3,500; wood stove - $1,200 for a 
total of $69,200) and only 10% of the marital obligations 
(Mountain America Construction Debt - $11,000) (R. 484-485) The 
net gain to Petitioner during this brief marriage was $58,200. 
Respondent, on the other hand, was awarded 12% of the marital 
assets (i.e. 1985 Ford Pickup - $3,500; 1994 Ford Mercury $6,000 
for a total of $9,500) and 90% of the marital obligation (i.e., 
$140,000 less the premarital note of $30,00^0, less the $29,900 
used to purchase the Diamond Valley Lot, and less the $3,000 of 
premarital credit card obligations paid from the proceeds of the 
refinancing for a total of $77,100). (R. 484-485; R. 398 511) 
The net to the Respondent was therefore a negative $67,600. The 
disparity between the parties pre and post marital net worth was 
therefore $125,000 with Respondent receiving all the loss and 
Petitioner all the gain! 
This inequitable distribution is not fair or supported by 
any recognized exception to the presumptive rule that each party 
is to receive an equal amount of the martial assets. 
A. Exceptional Circumstances: When separate property has lost 
its identity, the court may award it to the other spouse in lieu 
of alimony and in other extraordinary situations when equity so 
demands. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169. The trial court apparently 
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believed that despite its finding that the May 1995 divorce 
decree between the parties was res judicata, that it could find 
the results of the May 1995 divorce decree to be per se 
exceptional circumstances and redistribute property that was 
previously distributed under the May 1995 decree. 
Perceiving the consequences of the May 1995 "Quick-Court 
Kiosk'' divorce as being "patently inequitable", the lower court 
exceeded its equitable powers seeking to resurrect the 
Petitioner's interest in Respondent's previously awarded 
premarital pioperty that was traceable through all three prior 
divorces (R. 197-199, 200- 203, and 207-210). The relevant 
portions of the trial court' s discussion regarding this erroneous 
position is set forth as follows: 
My primary concern, and counsel probably already understand 
this and Mr. Bowen needs to understand it as well, the title 
situation with the home and the fact that that home was 
previously distributed in a prior decree between the parties 
that everybody just seemed to let, well, it's one of those 
do-it-yourself messes and Mr. Bowen ended up with no 
interest m the home as a matter of law previously, seemed 
to me to be patently inequitable in view of the sweat equity 
that he put into the home and that the testimony and the 
evidence supported. And I'm not sure that those findings 
are appropriately set forth in this decree to support the 
distribution that I felt was equitable in view of that fact. 
That is why I wanted to put the two pickups, or the two 
trucks and the lot into Mr. Bowen's possession because I 
felt it was well offset by the work that he had put into 
what really was not a marital home, it was an asset titled 
in Mrs. Bowen's name. And I'm wondering if the factual 
basis for that and the Findings of Fact that Mr. Bowen did 
contribute substantial value to that home without having any 
title whatsoever to it, I'm wondering if that is well enough 
supported to support that finding that I've got here. 
(R. 554, p. 10 1. 16 to p. 11 1. 11)(Emphasis added). 
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The court continued as follows: 
I think what I really have to find is that there is simply a 
demand in equity—. . .—that, that interest that was not 
present because of the do-it-yourself divorce between these 
parties prior to this one, left Mr. Bowen substantially at a 
disadvantage that had to be outweighed by this distribution 
of assets. Because that was my thinking . . . 
I felt that Mr. Bowen was really just painted into a corner 
on that and the only way to compensate him was by this 
distribution which, on its face without looking at that 
feature, makes him far the loser without this balancing that 
we did. 
(R. 554, p. 12 1. 24 to p. 13 1. 13)(Emphasis added).13 
However, the exceptional circumstances exception, is not 
applicable to this case for two reasons. First, the effects of 
the third divorce decree are res judicata in this proceeding. 
Krambule v. Krambule, 994 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1999) (R. 397, 115) 
Second, extraordinary circumstances can justify the award of a 
spouse's separate property, not a disproportionate award of 
marital property. One case of exceptional circumstances is Noble 
v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988). In Noble the husband shot 
the wife in the head at close range with a rifle while she was 
lying on the bed and she was permanently disabled. The court 
13What the Respondent finds ironic in the court's attempt to 
alleviate the "unavoidable consequences" of the 1995 divorce 
decree being the result of the "Quick-Court Kiosk" system is that 
there is no basis in law or fact for a contrary finding in the 
1995 divorce decree. The Respondent was awarded the real 
property in each of the parties divorces because the same was 
traceable to her premarital property interest. There was no 
dispute of that fact in any of the prior proceedings. In the 
July 14, 1994 divorce, the parties second divorce, where the 
Petitioner was represented by counsel and obtained a default 
divorce against the Respondent, the Respondent was awarded the 
real property. 
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approved awarding the husband's premarital property to the wife. 
The facts of this case, however, do not justify a variance 
from the presumption that each of the parties is entitled to 
fifty percent of the marital assets and all of their premarital 
assets. The lower court's desires to rectify a quick court 
divorce do not justify judicial review of a prior decree clearly 
entitled to full faith and credit and thereafter remedy a 
perceived inequity in a prior judgment by inequitably dividing 
marital assets in the 'instant case. Public policy would not 
countenance that the methodology used to obtain the third divorce 
somehow diminished its legal effect and make the same res 
judicata, but not really!14 
B. Contributions: Petitioner claimed that the unequal division 
of the marital assets by the trial court is supported by his 
contributions to the household during the fourth marriage. 
Petitioner introduced Exhibit 19, at pages 1-5, into evidence 
which set forth his alleged contributions to the household 
expenses. (R. 257-261) The payments, however, can be fairly 
summarized to be normal expenses that virtually every household 
would encounter. See R. 257-261 
Petitioner emphasized that he had made 19 mortgage payments 
during the marriage for a total of $15,462.05 (R. 262-263, 
mortgage payments only) and that he was entitled to some equity 
l4Supported even further, the state-wide advent of internet 
divorce forms available to the public at the Official Utah Court 
website. 
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in Respondent's premarital home based upon those payments. That 
is only 19 of the 33 monthly payments while the parties mutually 
occupied Respondent's premarital home, and 19 of 45-^payments if 
you take into account the parties' entire marriage. It is 
undisputed that the Respondent made the rest of the mortgage 
payments (R. 189, p. 18 11. 13-25) and that despite payments 
being made by both parties, no increase in equity was allocable 
to these payments, which largely only paid interest on the home 
loan. (R. 189, p. 21 11. 10-17; R. 238, 240) 
Petitioner also asserted that Respondent did not contribute 
to the marriage because she did not work. (R. 189, p. 12 11. 9-
12; R. 553, p. 16 11. 22-25) Petitioner's claim is without any 
factual support as there is no evidence that would support his 
contention that the Respondent did not work and/or contribute to 
the marriage. (R. 189, p. 12 11. 9-12; p. 16 11 22-24) Indeed, 
contrary evidence clearly demonstrates that Respondent worked for 
Human Services providing day care as set forth in Exhibit 8, at 
line 21 (R. 223, 1. 21), and that Respondent assisted the 
Petitioner in his construction jobs. (R. 189, p. 29 11. 1-21; R. 
323). The Respondent also did all of the household chores. (R. 
189, p. 28 1. 12 to p. 29 1. 5) 
Even were Petitioner's claim to have some evidentiary basis, 
it could not support the lower court's unequal distribution from 
a legal standpoint. First and foremost, the amount of a spouse's 
contribution is not a factor that the court considers. Dunn v. 
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Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Dunn, the 
trial court found that "the standard of living which the 
Plaintiff enjoyed during the course of the marriage was 
substantially greater than she ever could have achieved on her 
own." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322. The trial court further found 
that "the period of the marriage covered probably was the most 
productive period of the Defendant's life, when his abilities, 
personal to himself, increased the greatest through really no 
contribution of the Plaintiff other than her being married to 
him." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322. On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that the "trial court abused its discretion when it 
justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital 
property based solely on the parties' economic contributions to 
the marriage." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322, emphasis added. 
The circumstance of this case are similar to those in Lee v. 
Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Lee, the husband had 
started a corporation during the couple's marriage. His wife 
performed domestic duties and some clerical duties to allow her 
husband to extend his efforts full-time in the business. The 
Utah Court of Appeals held that the wife was entitled to a fair 
and equitable share of the marital assets. Lee, 744 P.2d at 
1381. Thus, a spouse's property award at the time of the divorce 
should not be measured according to the amount he or she directly 
contributed to the financial success of the marriage. "Such an 
analysis ignores contributions of love, encouragement, and 
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companionship, which elude monetary valuation. Such an analysis 
also gives short shrift to spouses who contribute homemaking 
skills and child care." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322. 
In this case, the evidence was undisputed that Respondent 
contributed which allowed the Petitioner's gross income to 
escalate during the marriage from $30,087 in 1995 (R. 226) to 
$50,563 in 1996 (R. 230) and $78,925 in 1997 (R. 235) 
C. Commingling: Petitioner argued that this was a case of 
commingling as the result of his contributions to the household 
and from the improvements he made to Respondent's premarital home 
which would support the unequal distribution of the marital 
assets and obligations. (R. 189, p. 12 11. 12-20, p. 11 11. 11) 
Petitioner's evidence supporting such a finding were Exhibits 16 
and 19. (R. 254, 257-261). 
As set forth above, the amount of contributions to ordinary 
household expenses, maintenance and mortgage payments, cannot 
support a commingling argument. Further, by definition, 
commingling occurs when a separate asset of one of the spouses is 
consumed during the marriage or its identity is lost. Here, 
premarital and marital assets and obligations are easily defined 
and traced. And, awarding assets to Petitioner and the entirety 
of the new debt incurred to purchase those assets to Respondent 
effectively avoids any equities that the concept of commingling 
might ocherwise seek to achieve. 
D. Enhancement: Courts have considered separate property as part 
29 
of the marital estate when the other spouse, by his or her 
efforts, augments, maintains, or protects the inherited or 
donated property, when the parties have inextricably commingled 
the property with marital property so that it has lost its 
separate character, or when the recipient spouse has contributed 
all or part of the property to the marital estate. Burt, 799 
P.2d at 1169. 
Petitioner only argued commingling at trial (R. 189, p. 11 
11. 11-12), not enhancement. However, as pointed out by 
Respondent at trial, the facts would lend themselves more to an 
enhancement claim and therefore he feels a need to address 
whether the vastly unequitable distribution of the marital assets 
can be supported based upon enhancement of Respondent's home. 
In this case, the trial court found that Petitioner enhanced 
Respondent's premarital home by at least $23,410.00. (See R. 395, 
Sill). The lower court did not set forth a factual basis to 
support such a finding. Even if the Petitioner had enhanced the 
value of the home by $23,410.00, the $23,410.00 does not justify 
the court's $135,000 disparity in allocating the distribution of 
assets and debts newly acquired during the marriage. 
Petitioner's evidence otherwise supporting an enhancement 
claim is set forth in Exhibits 3 (R. 204, comprising the 
premarital improvements) 16 (R. 254, the improvements made during 
the marriage) and 19 (R. 257, the household expenses paid). 
Petitioner's estimated costs on Exhibit 3 and 16, are not broken 
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down into labor and material, and Petitioner presented no 
evidence on that would allow one to distinguish between labor and 
material in light of the undisputed fact that Respondent paid for 
some materials, other materials were salvaged from jobs, and rock 
and gravel were taken from the hills. (R. 189, p. 20 11. 13-24, 
p. 18, 11. 10-12) Petitioner also failed to put on any evidence 
regarding whether the improvements actually increased the value 
of the Respondent's premarital home and, if sof in what amount. 
The Petitioner did introduce an appraisal, after trial, however, 
showing that the premarital home had increased in value during 
the marriage to $224,000 (R. 405-420), but the appraisal did not 
distinguish those increases attributable solely to inflation and 
market factors as compared to that increase uniquely attributable 
to Petitioner's alleged contributions.15 
Similarly, Petitioner's Exhibit 3 (R. 204-206) cannot 
support an enhancement claim from either a legal or factual 
standpoint. First, legally, the res judicata effect of the May 
1995 divorce decree does not allow the court to consider the 
improvements made prior to the decree. Second, factually, the 
evidence clearly established Petitioner's company, Interwest Home 
Works, had in fact been paid for most of these premarital 
improvements. (R. 205-206, 290) Exhibit 19 also cannot support 
l5See Exhibit 56 (R. 421) , which shows that the premarital 
home was listed for $198,000, was reduced to $189,900, and 
reduced further to $183,000 in December 1998, and no offers were 
forthcoming. Respondent's appraisal found the premarital home 
had a value of $157,000. (R. 333) 
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the enhancement claim either as it simply sets forth household 
expenses paid by the Petitioner. (R. 257) The same did not 
enhance the value of the home, but are ordinarily incident to the 
day to day status of being married. 
In its best light, Petitioner's Exhibit 16 (R. 254) standing 
alone would only support an enhancement claim in the amount of 
$17,567 and then only if (1) the Petitioner had made all the 
improvements alone, (2) had paid for all of the materials for 
said improvements, and (3) the cost of the improvements resulted 
in a dollar for dollar increase in the value of the Respondent's 
premarital home. Petitioner did not put on any evidence to 
establish any one of these prerequisite. Further, undisputed 
evidence clearly demonstrated the following: 
i. The evidence from Mr. Hafen, a disinterested, 
licensed general contractor, testimony was that Petitioner's 
estimate of the costs of the improvements set forth in Exhibit 16 
had been overstated by 100% (doubled). (R. 189, p. 35 11. 1-13). 
ii. The undisputed evidence showed that Petitioner did 
not pay for the materials used in the improvements, that 
Respondent paid for some of the materials used and that some 
materials came from other job sites, with rocks and gravel were 
gathered by both parties from the surrounding hills. (R. 189, p. 
20 11. 13-24, p. 18 11. 10-12) Without a breakdown of 
Petitioner's costs between labor and material, the court's 
assigning a value to the Petitioner's labor could only be 
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speculative and arbitrary. 
iii. The undisputed evidence was that Ftespondent 
assisted Petitioner in making the improvements which would 
further reduce his enhancement claim, as did the labor and 
efforts of Respondent's son-in-law, Ken Thornock. (R. 189, p. 20 
11. 10-13; R. 189, p. 33 11. 6-13) 
iv. Respondent's Exhibit 42 (R. 333-342) was also 
uncontroverted that the landscaping only enhanced the value of 
the house by $3,000 and the fencing only enhanced the value by 
$2,000. (R. 338) Neither party introduced any evidence 
whatsoever regarding the increased value of the home from the 
improvements for the concrete, block or brick work. 
Issue No. 2 
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
somewhat lesser burden of proof for reversing a judge's findings 
is borne by demonstrating that they are "against the clear weight 
of the evidence". Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). 
Furthermore, whether the judge could enter additional findings is 
a question of law, which is given no special deference. 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). Rule 52(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the determinative rule on 
the issue of amending findings of fact. 
Petitioner filed a motion to amend and requested that the 
lower court allocate the $11,000 Mountain America construction 
loan to Respondent and additionally award Petitioner $1,500 as 
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damages to the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup. The lower court amended 
its original findings of fact and conclusions of law and changed 
the character of the Chase Credit Card debt, the Advanta Credit 
Card debt, and the Mountain America Credit Card debt from marital 
obligations allocated to Petitioner to premarital obligations of 
Respondent. The court also changed the wood stove from a marital 
asset to the Petitioner's premarital asset. 
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial 
court may amend its findings upon motion, but the amended 
findings herein are neither supported by the evidence, nor were 
any reasons for such modifications indicated. See Christensen v. 
Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981), Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to enter specific detailed findings 
supporting its financial determinations. Respondent will address 
each of the credit card obligations separately. 
A. Chase Credit Card Debt: The undisputed facts with regard to 
the Chase Credit Card debt are as follows: 
a. The Chase Credit Card debt was incurred by 
Petitioner thirty days prior to the parties' separation when 
Petitioner purchased tools from Harbor Freight Tools, a cash 
advance at First Security Bank, a construction seminar in Salt 
Lake City, an obligation to Dixie Fastening Systems, an 
obligation to Western Rock Products, an obligation to the Pipe 
Connection, and an obligation to Beehive Rental & Sales. See 
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Exhibit: 43. (R. 345) 
b. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 19, 1999, (R. 395) the trial court appropriately 
allocated this debt to Petitioner. Paragraph 10, April 19, 1999, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 397-398, SI10) 
c. In the Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 15, 1999, (R. 483) the trial 
court incorrectly reallocated this debt to Respondent as a 
premarital obligation. See Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, October 15, 1999, Paragraph 10(b) (R. 484, 
SIlOb) . The undisputed evidence before the trial court, however, 
was that the premarital credit card obligations of Respondent 
were entirely paid off with monies from the first November 1995 
refinance on her premarital home. See Exhibit 27 (R. 291). 
At the February 3, 2000 hearing Petitioner agreed that this 
new debt was due to his use of the Chase credit card, and that 
said use was during the marriage, but argued that the items 
purchased were somehow for the benefit of the marital estate and, 
therefore, the obligation was not his separate debt. (R. 553, p. 
16 11. 9-15, p. 17 11. 14-16 and 18-22) This argument, however, 
cannot by some alchemy convert this Chase debt to Respondent* s 
premari^tal obligation, as this ruling defies both the chronology 
of the.debt's incurrence and the nature of the items purchased by 
Petitioner uniquely for his use. 
B. Advanta Credit Card Debt: The undisputed evidence with 
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regard to the Advanta Credit Card debt is as follows: 
a. The Advanta Credit Card debt was incurred by 
Petitioner within sixty days prior to parties' separation, when 
Petitioner used the card for a cash advance from First Security 
Bank, a construction seminar in Salt Lake City, and his 
construction company's obligation to the National Assessment 
Institute. Petitioner initially incurred these expenses on an 
AT&T credit card which was then rolled into the Advanta Credit 
Card. See Exhibit 44 (R. 347-349). 
b. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 19, 1999 (R. 395), the Court correctly allocated the 
debt to Petitioner. See Paragraph 10, April 16, 1999, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 397-398, 110). 
c. In the Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 15, 1999, (R. 483) the Court 
incorrectly reallocated the debt to Respondent as a premarital 
obligation! See Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, October 15, 1999, Paragraph 10(b) (R. 484, 110b). The 
evidence before the Court, however, was that the premarital 
credit card obligations of Respondent were wholly paid off with 
monies from the November 1995 refinance on her premarital home. 
See Exhibit 27 (R. 291). 
C. Mountain America Credit Card Debt: The undisputed facts 
regarding the Mountain America Credit Card debt are as follows: 
a. The Mountain America Credit Card debt was incurred 
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by the parties as a cash advance in the early part of February, 
1998. See Exhibit 41 (R. 332). The monies borrowed were used to 
make the mortgage payment on Respondent's premarital home. 
However, Petitioner claimed that this very house payment was his 
personal contribution from his checking account. See Exhibit 19, 
pg. 5., under year 1998 (R. 263) 
b. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 19, 1999, (R. 395) the Court correctly allocated the 
Mountain America credit card debt to Petitioner. See Paragraph 
10, April 16, 1999, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
397-398, 110). 
c. In the Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 15, 1999 (R. 483), the Court 
reallocated the debt to Respondent as a premarital obligation. 
See Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, October 
15, 1999, Paragraph 10(b) (R. 484, 1 10b). 
At the February 3, 2000 hearing, Petitioner agreed that this 
debt was incurred due to his use of the Mountain America credit 
card, that said use was during the marriage, but again argued 
that the items purchased were for the benefit of the marital 
estate and, therefore, the debt was not his separate obligation. 
(R. 553, p. 16 11. 9-15, p. 17 11. 14-16 and 18-22) 
Despite the undisputed evidence that Respondent's premarital 
credit card obligations had been paid off by the November 1995 
refinancing and Petitioner's acknowledgment that the various 
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credit card obligations were incurred by Petitioner during the 
marriage (R. 553, p. 16 11. 9-15), the trial court still refused 
to deem the credit card obligations marital and equitable 
allocate the same. Defying both chronology and without viewing 
the nature of the expenditures, the lower court talismanically 
allocated all of them to Respondent as premarital. These 
amendments cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, have no support in 
the evidence, and were not requested by anyone. Simply stated, 
the lower court has, sua sponte, reached out and ruled on an 
issue in a manner neither advocate even suggested was possible, 
and, which ruling infringes on the advocates' role. See e.g. 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, (Utah 1983). 
Issue No. 3 
As a general rule, each party is to retain his separate 
property and its appreciation in value in the division of assets 
and debts. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990); 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990); Mortenson v. 
Mortenson, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); Dunn, supra at 1320; 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994); 
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991). 
The case at hand, as set forth below, is very much akin to 
the factual situations in Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 
1982), Newmeyer, supra, Humphries v. Humphries, 520 P.2d 193 
(Utah 1974), and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 
1980). In all those cases, the separate property of the party 
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was awarded as separate property, as well as proportionate 
appreciation on the separate property during the marriage with 
only the excess equity then being equally divided. 
In Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court found that despite the parties constructing a 
cabin during the marriage, the husband should have been given 
credit for the value of his premarital assets sold for $9,300 
plus its proportionate appreciation before the excess equity was 
divided. See also Jesperson v, Jesperson, supra, at 328, where 
despite title being in joint tenancy, Plaintiff was allowed to 
recoup the equivalent value of assets brought into the marriage 
and subsequently titled jointly. 
Thus, the Winchester Hills Lot 127, 1989 Ford Dually Pickup, 
1993 Ford Pickup, wood stove, and saddle which were purchased 
during the marriage with proceeds directly traceable to loans 
derived from Respondent's premarital home should be deemed 
Respondent's separate property absent exigent circumstances. 
Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), Newmeyer, supra, 
Humphries v. Humphries, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974), and Jesperson 
v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). The alternative would be 
to leave the newly acquired assets as marital, but find that an 
amount of the newly obtained mortgage on Respondent's premarital 
home equal to the purchase price of the asset be similarly deemed 
a marital obligation and equitably apportioned. 
There was no evidence of enhancement, maintenance, 
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protection, or commingling introduced with regard to these 
traceable assets that would tend to support a finding that the 
assets were marital, or, in the alternative, if found to be 
marital that the corresponding obligation should not be equitably 
apportioned. The evidence that would support a finding that the 
assets are the separate assets of Respondent is as follows: 
A. Winchester Hills Lot 127: Respondent purchased Winchester 
Hills Lot for $39,000. It is undisputed that Respondent 
refinanced her home on two occasions, and that $12,782.15 of the 
first refinancing's proceeds and $20,700.00 of the second 
refinancing's proceeds were directly paid towards said purchase. 
(Exhibit 27, p. 1-2; R. 291-292). It is also undisputed that the 
Respondent borrowed $3,000 from her children to pay yet another 
payment. (R. 189, p. 19, 11. 22-24) A paltry $29,000 towards the 
purchase came from Petitioner's account. (Exhibit 19, p. 8; R. 
264). The trial court found that the Winchester Hills Lot 127 
was marital, and then awarded the lot to Petitioner, allocated 
the mortgage increase of over $33,000 to Respondent by virtue of 
the allocation of the entire $140,000 mortgage on Respondent's 
premarital home solely to her. 
Petitioner may argue that the same was commingled due to the 
title of the Winchester Hills Lot 127 being placed into both 
parties' names on April 17, 1998. See Exhibit 14 (R. 252). The 
courts have long held that the trial court is empowered to make 
such distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel such 
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conveyances as are necessary to that end. Jackson v. Jackson, 
617 P.2d 338 340-41 (Utah 1980); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 
(Utah 1986); Hoagland v, Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 
1993). 
It is undisputed that Respondent had originally applied for 
a construction loan on this lot titled solely in her name, but 
Mountain America Credit Union denied her application based upon 
Respondent's income. Mountain America Credit Union then 
indicated that the construction loan could be obtained if her 
husband, Petitioner, were included in the application, and if the 
Winchester Hills Lot 127 and the Diamond Valley Lot 19 were both 
transferred into both Petitioner's and Respondent's names. (R. 
189, p. 6 1. 15 to p. 7 1. 1; R. 189, p. 16 1. 25 to p. 17 1. 2) 
It is also undisputed that Respondent deeded the Winchester Hills 
Lot 127 to the Petitioner and herself, without independent 
consideration, by quit claim deed, on the 17tn day of April, 
1998. (R. 252) Thereafter, the Mountain America construction 
loan was approved. See Exhibit 13 (R. 248). Therefore, title 
transfer was a married woman's inducement to a bank to lend 
construction funds and should be recognized as such. 
Even if the evidence did support a finding of exceptional 
circumstances, and Winchester Hills Lot 127 is deemed to be 
marital property, an equivalent amount of the obligation on the 
Respondent's premarital home incurred to purchase this lot should 
also have to be deemed a marital obligation and logically 
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allocated to the party awarded the lot. Despite assertions to 
the contrary, Petitioner should not be allowed to receive 
Winchester Hills Lot 127 as a marital asset and have Respondent 
then retire the increased debt incurred for the lot's purchase. 
The resulting effect is twice the purchase price of $39,000 or a 
$78,000 swing in the parties' respective equities, arguably more 
so considering the lot was worth $55,000 at the time of the 
divorce. (R. 484, 510(c)) 
B. Saddle: It is undisputed that Respondent purchased the saddle 
during the marriage for $1,200 from Grant Bowen, Petitioner's 
father. It is also undisputed that the value of the saddle was 
$2,000. It is undisputed, or at least the substantial weight of 
the evidence is, that the saddle was purchased from proceeds from 
the refinancing of Respondent's premarital home. Exhibit 53 (R. 
373) is the check withdrawal receipt from Respondent's checking 
account to Grant Bowen for $1,200. At one point, Petitioner 
proffered the testimony of his parents Grant Bowen and Shirley 
Bowen to the effect that the $1,200 check came from Petitioner's 
account and that the saddle was worth more than the $1,200, but 
the balance was a gift from Grant Bowen to the Petitioner. (R. 
189, p. 41 11. 8-17). Petitioner had no documentary evidence to 
support this parental contention, which is entirely controverted 
by Respondent's check withdrawal receipt. 
Juxtaposing the proffer by Grant Bowen that the check was 
from Petitioner with documentary evidence to the contrary, the 
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allegation of "gifting" of the balance of the purchase price 
should also be given little weight. 
Despite the physical, documented evidence, the trial court 
incongruously found the saddle to be the premarital asset of 
Petitioner. This finding is contrary to all of the evidence in 
the record. At best, the evidence would support a finding that 
the saddle was a marital asset, that the parties purchased the 
same for $1,200, and that whoever was awarded the saddle should 
pay an amount of the mortgage equal to the purchase price, 
$1,200, as a marital obligation. 
In the alternative, the saddle should be deemed the separate 
property of Respondent as the purchase price was paid by proceeds 
directly traceable to Respondent's refinance of her premarital 
home, and Respondent is paying said purchase price via the trial 
court's allocation of the entire mortgage associated with the 
Respondent's premarital house as Respondent's sole obligation. 
(R. 39, 511) 
C. 1989 Ford Dually Pickup: It is undisputed that Respondent 
purchased the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup during the parties' 
marriage. It is also undisputed that the funds Respondent used 
to purchase the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup were proceeds from the 
December 10, 1997 refinance of Respondent's premarital home. See 
Exhibit 10, p. 1 (R. 240); Exhibit 27, p. 1 (R. 292); Exhibit 32 
(R. 319); Exhibit 33 (R. 320); Exhibit 34 (R. 321); and (R. 189, 
p. 22 11. 8-10). 
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The trial court, despite this undisputed evidence, found 
that the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup was a marital asset, awarded the 
same to Petitioner, and allocated the entire debt incurred for 
this purchase to Respondent as her separate obligation. This 
finding is contrary to the undisputed evidence, and only 
exacerbates the inequities of the lower court's allocation of 
assets and debts to somehow remedy a perceived inequities in the 
parties' third, '"Kiosk" divorce. 
The 1989 Ford Dually Pickup should be found to be the 
separate property of Respondent as the purchase price was paid 
from proceeds directly traceable to the refinance of Respondent's 
premarital home. Respondent would remain obligated to pay the 
corresponding obligation. In the alternative, if the 1989 Ford 
Dually Pickup is deemed to be a marital asset, then an amount of 
Respondent's mortgage on her premarital home equal to the 
purchase price of the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup, $9,500, should be 
deemed a marital obligation, and appropriately allocated to the 
party retaining the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup. 
D. 1993 Ford Pickup: The 1993 Ford Pickup was Petitioner's 
premarital asset and was awarded to Petitioner with no attendant 
obligation. However, the undisputed evidence is that at the time 
of the parties' marriage, the 1993 Ford Pickup was worth 
approximately $5,500 and that Petitioner still owed approximately 
$9,000, on the same, or $3,500 more on this vehicle than its 
value. (R. 189, p. 17 11. 11-12) 
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It is also undisputed that Respondent used $6,371.86 from 
the proceeds of her November 21, 1995, refinance of her 
premarital home to pay the obligation on Petitioner's premarital 
1993 Ford Pickup leaving the same free and clear. See Exhibit 
27, p. 1 (R. 292). It was also not in dispute that the 1993 Ford 
Pickup had a value of $3,500 at the time of the parties' divorce. 
Therefore, the-trial court's findings are not supported by 
the evidence regarding the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup, the 1993 Ford 
Pickup, and the wood stove as these items were either purchased 
during the marriage, from Respondent's premarital assets or paid 
off from sources traceable thereto. Consequently, Respondent 
should either be awarded these assets, or if Petitioner retains 
these assets, the increase in debt on Respondent's mortgage from 
their purchase, or debt reduction in reference to the 1993 Ford 
Pickup, should be allocated to Petitioner as his separate 
obligation. Respondent first seeks the award of these assets as 
her separate property, or in the alternative, if the same are to 
remain marital, then the corresponding obligation on the 
Respondent's premarital home should be found to be marital and 
equitably allocated, based on who receives the asset. 
E. IRS Obligation: The undisputed evidence at trial was that the 
Petitioner had a premarital tax obligation to the IRS in the 
stated amount of $43,329.58, as of November 16, 1998 (R. 350; R. 
189, p. 17, 1. 11), and that said obligation attached as a lien 
on Winchester Hills Lot 127 and Diamond Valley Lot 19 when the 
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Petitioner's name was placed on title to both lots on April 17, 
1998 to induce a construction loan to Respondent. (R. 189, p. 4 
11. 8-23; p. 4 1. 24 to p. 5 1. 11) Exhibit 14. (R. 252) 
Respondent, at trial sought a finding consistent with the 
evidence that the Petitioner's debt to the IRS remained 
Petitioner's separate obligation. Petitioner also agreed to 
accept the tax lien as his premarital obligation. (R. 189 , p. 
13 11. 13-21) 
Despite the undisputed evidence and Petitioner's stipulation 
regarding this tax obligation, the lower court found that there 
was no "evidence that the tax lien (of $43,000) will have an 
impact on the dissolution of this marriage and distribution of 
the property of the marriage." (R. 399, fl2) The trial court 
therefore made no order with regard to the "alleged tax lien." 
(R. 399, 3112). Failing to rule on this issue alone constitutes 
reversible error; insofar as the lien is for $43,000 it cannot be 
gainsaid that it has a substantial impact on the marital asset 
structure. The lower court's ruling consistent with the evidence 
and Petitioner's stipulation is mandated. Boyer v. Lignell, 567 
P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
The "no impact" basis for failure to address the issue is 
not supported by the undisputed facts that the IRS lien had 
attached to the two lots. As one of the lots was awarded to 
Respondent but now is liened, this clearly effects her financial 
status ana distinctly and significantly compromises the lot's 
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value. The trial court should be required to make a finding that 
the tax lien is Petitioner's premarital obligation, that he is to 
retire said debt, and that he is to hold Respondent harmless 
therefrom. Ld. To state that a federal tax lien of this amount 
has no impact is judicially untenable. 
As set forth in the argument for Issue No. 1, supra, there 
was no evidence of extraordinary circumstances, the same being 
contribution, commingling, enhancement, or otherwise, that would 
support the court's findings that these assets were marital, 
award the same to Petitioner, yet allocate all these obligations 
solely to Respondent and lastly let her suffer as well those 
harms incident to a federal tax lien which was concededly 
Petitioner's premarital obligation. 
Issue No. 4 
The lower court failed to amend the incorrect amended 
findings upon motion despite undisputed evidence to the contrary. 
Whether the trial court could subsequently enter additional 
findings however, is a question of law, which is given no special 
deference. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
Following entry of the Supplemental Decree, Respondent filed 
a motion to amend the findings and amended findings and 
memorandum in support thereof on December 1, 1999. (R. 505-527) 
Respondent requested therein that the credit card obligations be 
changed from the premarital obligations of Respondent to be 
marital obligations as the same were clearly incurred during the 
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marriage but allocate the same to Petitioner as he was the only 
one who benefitted from these obligations. Respondent also 
requested that the wood stove, Winchester Hills Lot 127, 1989 
Ford Dually, 1993 Ford Pickup, and saddle be awarded to her as 
her separate property as the same were purchased from proceeds of 
the refinancing of her premarital home and she had been burdened 
with these new obligations, alternatively, Respondent requested 
that Petitioner be responsible for the corresponding obligations 
incurred for the assets he was awarded (R. 507-527). 
A. Credit Card Obligations: See discussion above, Issue No. 2, 
A., B. and C. The undisputed evidence was that the credit card 
obligations were incurred during the marriage. Even Petitioner 
acknowledged that the credit card obligations were incurred by 
Petitioner during the marriage (R. 554, p. 16 11. 9-15), which 
acknowledgment comports with Respondent's position that not only 
were the obligations marital, but that they only benefitted the 
Petitioner and should therefore be deemed his separate 
obligations. The trial court still refused to deem the credit 
card obligations marital. 
B. Winchester Hills Lot 127, 1989 Ford Dually Pickup, and 1993 
Ford Pickup: See discussion above, Issue No. 3, A. B., C , and D. 
The court denied Respondent's motion in all respects with regard 
to the assets either being deemed the separate property of 
Respondent where the proceeds to purchase the assets were 
directly traceable to her premarital home and she was paying the 
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associated increased obligation. The court also denied the 
request that if the assets were marital, then it would only be 
fair and equitable to allocate some of the new mortgage debt to 
Petitioner. Of course, the court correctly did change the wood 
stove from a premarital asset of Petitioner's to a marital asset, 
but the same was still pyrrhically awarded to Petitioner (R. 560-
563). The ultimate value of marital assets awarded to Petitioner 
was therefore $58,200 with $9,500 in marital assets to 
Respondent. (R. 484, 485) Further, the court, despite 
indicating that the third divorce decree was res judicata as to 
the fourth divorce, nonetheless, dealt with the judicially 
memorialized quick court kiosk divorce as a bastard child, and 
overtly distributed the assets of the fourth marriage apparently 
to curb the perceived injustice to Petitioner which the lower 
court believes resulted from that third decree, and not based 
upon any evidence or admissible equities in this matter. (R. 
398-399; R. 554, p. 10 1. 16 to p. 11 1. 11, and p. 12 1. 24 to 
p. 13 1. 13). Ultimately, the thrust of the lower court's ruling 
is that the quick court kiosk filing system is but a trial run 
and should be given little credence at a later date. As a matter 
of public policy, this position is tenuous at best and, viewed 
with judicial scrutiny, and, consistent with public policy, is 
indefensible. Office of Recovery Services v. V.P.G., 845 P.2d 
944, 946(Utah App. 1992) . 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that the matter be remanded 
with instructions that the lower court properly determine what 
assets and obligations are marital and what assets and 
obligations are premarital, and enter appropriate findings 
equitably award the marital assets and allocating the marital 
obligations. In light of the lower court's unwillingness to do 
so despite the undisputed evidence, Respondent respectfully 
requests that instructions to the lower court be specific. 
DATED this <3/&Tday of December, 2000. 
MICHAEL D. HUSHES, FOR 
HUGHES & BURSELL 
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served two copies of the attached Brief of Appellant upon James 
E. Slemboski, the counsel for the appellee in this matter, by 
hand delivering the same to him at the following address: 
James E. Slemboski 
SLEMBOSKI & HUTCHINSON, L.L.C. 
32 East 100 South, Suite 203 
P.O. Box 1717 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney of Record (J 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1993) 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts 
or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an 
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the 
payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the 
parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective 
creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, 
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties1 separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 
62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or 
after January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, a 
order assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month 
check processing fee to be included in the amount withheld and 
paid to the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of 
Human Services for the purposes of income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training o 
the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing 
the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the 
custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
A. 1 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace 
officer enforcement, the court may include in an order 
establishing a visitation schedule a provision, among other 
things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court ordered 
visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the 
court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys1 
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the 
court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of 
the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a 
visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party 
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors 
in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of 
living, existing at the time of separation, in determining 
alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). However, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living 
that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold 
of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in 
dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of 
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, 
the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration 
dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the 
A. 2 
condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of 
the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at 
the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(lii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if 
the court finds that the payorfs improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time 
prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer 
period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, 
any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that 
former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found 
to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment 
and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1996) 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; 
or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
^jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
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(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under "Section 63-46a-
12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(e) appeals form a court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs 
sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other 
criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole except cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations 
cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, 
property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, 
and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote 
of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for 
original appellate review and determination any matter over which 
the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
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the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions,—except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make 
additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The 
motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an 
objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in 
actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may 
be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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 7 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN EARL BOWEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
PATRICIA D BOWEN, 
Respondent. 
r(ijV. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No 984500349 DA 
Judge James L Shumate 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for trial on the 4th day of February, 1999, before 
the Court, the Honorable James L Shumate, Fifth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding The 
Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by counsel, James E Slemboski, of Slemboski 
& Hutchinson, L L C , and the Respondent appeared in person and was represented by counsel, 
Ronald L Read, of Hughes & Read The Court granted Petitioner's motion to bifurcate, 
reserving the issues of support, property division and debt allocation, and attorney's fees for 
determination at trial. The parties were divorced by a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce entered 
March 4, 1999, granting to the Petitioner a Decree of Divorce on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences. Further grounds for the divorce action were reserved by each 
of the parties to be considered at trial. The Court heard the evidence proffered by the parties 
admitted herein, and received exhibits from the parties 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT MAKES AND ENTERS THE FOLLOWING 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties to this proceeding were married on August 4, 1995 in Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming 
2. The parties to this proceeding had been married and divorced on three 
occasions prior to the current marriage and the relevant information regarding the same are as 
follows. 
a. Married September 22, 1989, Divorced February 25, 1993; Mr 
Bowen was the Plaintiff and Mrs. Bowen was the Defendant; the case was filed in Utah and was 
resolved by written stipulation 
b. Married April 26, 1993, Divorced July I, 1994, Mr. Bowen was the 
Plaintiff and was represented by counsel and Mrs. Bowen was the Defendant; the case was filed in 
Idaho and was resolved by Mrs. Bowen's default. 
c. Married November 24, 1994, Divorced May 19, 1995, Mrs. Bowen 
was the Plaintiff and Mr Bowen was the Defendant; the case was filed in Utah and was resolved 
by the Petitioner executing a waiver and consent, the decree provided that there were no marital 
assets to be divided. 
3. Respondent purchased the Diamond Valley Residence in September, 
1993. She paid $19,000.00 for the lot and $90,000.00 to build the home for a total 
investment of approximately $109,000.00. 
4. The parties were divorced July 1, 1994 ( Exhibit P-2). Respondent 




5. The Court, therefore, finds that the Petitioner's claim for enhancement of 
theumarital home" for improvements made to the same, as set forth in Exhibit 3, are irrelevant to 
this action, as the same are res judicata, due to the May 19, 1995, Decree of Divorce, since the 
real estate under that home was purchased by the Respondent in September of 1993 and although 
the parties jointly did some work on that home after the September 1993 purchase, the Petitioner 
waived any claims to that property in May of 1995, when he agreed that there were no marital 
assets to be distributed by the Court. 
6. The Respondent obtained a protective order which is consolidated herein 
and the terms and conditions of which are incorporated herein. Based upon the issuance of said 
protective order and the fact that the Petitioner has neither proffered or offered any evidence to 
the contrary. Petitioner seeks a restraining order that the Respondent not come within 100 feet 
and not contact or harass the Petitioner or his family The Petitioner and Respondent should 
each be granted such an order. 
7. No children have been born as issue of the marriage and none are expected. 
8. The Respondent seeks alimony for a period equal to the length of time of 
the marriage. However, the Court found at trial that the parties are both capable of their own 
support, and in view of their debt structure neither could pay alimony or attorney's fees to the 
other, and, therefore, no alimony or attorney's fees are awarded to either party. 
9. The Respondent seeks to have her name changed to "Hall", and should 
hereinafter be known as "Patricia D. Hall." 
10. The Court finds that the marital assets and liabilities are and should be 
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11. The disparity in the share of the marital estate is equitably balanced by the 
retention of the Diamond Valley home and its debt to the Respondent. The Petitioner claims that 
he is entitled to an interest in that home that exceeds the $23,410.00 difference in the distribution 
above. The Court finds that the Petitioner contributed that much value to the Diamond Valley 
home, but the award of that home to the Respondent is mandated by the prior Decree of Divorce, 
so this distribution achieves the equitable objectives of the Court. The Court specifically finds 





*Quick-Court Kiosk" for divorce in 1995. They decided to not consult with counsel and the 
unavoidable consequences of that decision have resulted in this outcome. 
12. The parties raised the issue of a possible tax lien of over 10 years ago that 
may affect the Petitioner's property. The Court is not convinced by the requisite evidence that the 
tax lien will have an impact on the dissolution of this marriage and distribution of the property of 
the marriage Therefore, no order is made with reference to the alleged tax lien 
ORDERS ON ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE 
13. Respondent sought an Order to Show Cause In Re Contempt alleging that 
the Petitioner failed to comply with the orders of this Court to provide temporary support in the 
amount of $600 per month. This was ordered at the September 17, 1998 hearing on temporary 
orders The same was to be due on the 26th day of each and every month commencing with the 
month of September. The Petitioner paid $600 on October 9, 1998 (September 26 payment), a 
payment on November 22, 1998 (October 26 payment), and made no further payments until he 
paid $1,800 in late January (November 26 payment, December 26 payment and January 26 
payment) The Petitioner has not paid the February, 1999 payment. The Petitioner has not 
responded to the allegations in any fashion, let alone set forth any reasonable justification or 
excuse for his failure to comply. Therefore, the Court finds the Petitioner in contempt for his 
willful failure to comply with the temporary support order Respondent should be awarded her 
reasonable attorney fees and costs in the amount of $250 for having to bring this matter to the 
Court's attention. 




alleging that the Petitioner failed to comply with the orders of this Court, dated August 14, 1998, 
to provide the Respondent a monthly accounting of his business. Petitioner provided an 
accounting from August 14, 1998 to September 14, 1998, and then failed to provide any further 
accounting until the day of trial. Petitioner also failed to provide any reason or justification for his 
failure. Therefore, the Court finds that the Petitioner willfully failed to comply with this Court's 
Order and further finds the Petitioner in contempt of the same. Respondent should be awarded 
her reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $250 for having to bring this matter to the Court's 
attention. 
15. Respondent is obligated to pay Petitioner his attorney's fees inclined 
in connection with the Order To Show Cause hearing held on November 25, 1998 in 
v Inch the Court found Respondent in contempt for her failure to return Petitioner's 
personal property to him as was ordered by the Court. The Court hereby awards 
Petitioner judgment against the Respondent for his attorney's fees and costs in the 
amount of $ 1,542.00 together with interest at the statutory rate from November 25, 1998. 
16. The Decree must provide that the parties execute any and all 
documents of conveyance to effectuate the orders of this Court. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A Final Decree of Divorce should be prepared by Mr. Read incorporating 
all of the terms in the foregoing Findings. 
6 
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DATED this j£- day of -Af^- 1999 
JAMFfS L. SHUMATE 
'DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused a full, true and correct copy of the above and 
.regoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand-delivered on 
, e
 H$ day of April, 1999, addressed as follows. 
James E. Slemboski 
Slemboski & Hutchinson 
32 East 100 South, Suite 203 
St George, UT 84770 
Ronald L Read 
Hughes & Read 
187 North 100 West 
St George, UT 84770 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN EARL BOWEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 




Case No. 984500349 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This case comes before the Court on Petitioner Steven Earl Bowen's "Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," filed with a supporting memorandum on May 6, 1999 
^Respondent's Objection to Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" was filed on 
May 17, 1999 A Notice to Submit was subsequently filed on Sep 20, 1999 by Respondent, and a 
Request for Hearing was filed on Sep. 21, 1999 by Petitioner Because the Request for Hearing was 
not filed at the time of the principal memorandum, as required by Utah C J A. Rule 4-501(3), the 
Request for Hearing is denied and the Court addresses the Motion to Amend as submitted 
Also before the Court is Respondent Patricia D Bowen's "Motion [] for a New Trial/' filed 
with a supporting memorandum on May 19, 1999 A "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion for New Trial" was filed on Jun 16, 1999 
A Notice to Submit was then filed on Sep. 20, 1999 by Respondent, and a Request for Hearing was 
filed on Sep 21, 1999 by Petitioner. Again, because of its untimely filing, the Request for Hearing is 
denied and the Court rules on the Motion for New Trial without oral argument. 




This dispute stems from the entry of the Court's Apr. 16, 1999 "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law," paragraph 10 of which distributed the assets and liabilities of the parties as 
follows' 
To Petitioner 
Winchester Hills Lot $55,000.00 
•89 Ford Dually Truck $9,500.00 
'93 Ford Pickup $3,500.00 
Tools $16,800.00 
Saddle $2,000.00 
Mt. America Visa Debt $(1,200.00) 
Advanta Credit Card Debt $(1,450.00) 
Chase Manhattan Visa Debt $(2,500.00) 
Net Total $81,090.00 
To Respondent 
Diamond Valley Lot $45,000.00 
'85 Ford Pickup $3,500.00 
'94 Mercury $3,000.00 
Furniture $5,000.00 
Wood Stove $1,200 
Television $ 600.00 
Personal Property $5,505.00 
Student Loan Debt $(6,125.00) 
Net Total $57,680.00 
In explanation of the division, the Court stated that tl[t]he disparity in the share of the marital estate is 
equitably balanced by the retention of the Diamond Valley Home and its debt to the Respondent/' the 
award of which was "mandated by the prior Decree of Divorce . . . ." See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 4. In addition, regarding construction and improvements made to the "marital 
home" by the parties, the Court declared in Paragraph 5 "that Petitioner's claim for enhancement of 
the w marital home' for improvements made to the same, as set forth in Exhibit 3, are irrelevant to this 
action, as the same are res judicata, due to the May 19, 1995 Decree of Divorce . . [T]he Petitioner 
waived any claims to that property in may of 1995 when he agreed that there were no marital assets to 
be distributed by the Court." Id. at 3. 
Finally, regarding the determination of liability for a tax lien which Respondent claims has 
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attached to both the Diamond Valley and Winchester Hills lots, the Court stated simply that it u[wa]s 
not convinced by the requisite evidence that the tax lien will have an impact on the dissolution of th[e] 
marriage and distribution of the property of the marriage. Therefore, no order is made with reference 
to the tax lien. Id. at 5. 
ANALYSIS 
The Court shall first consider Respondent's Motion for a New Trial. The Court shall then 
review Petitioner's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. 
/. Motion for New Trial 
Respondent argues that a new trial is justified under Utah R Civ. P 59(a) "due to the 
irregularity in the proceedings of the Court taking proffers of witnesses, some of which were not even 
present or designated as witnesses." See Motion [] for a New Trial, and Supporting Memorandum, 
p 2 [hereinafter Motion for New Trial]. Respondent also argues that a new trial is justified on the 
basis of the parties's submission of "exhibits not available until after trial," and the lack of "Insufficient 
evidence before the court to render the findings and conclusions of law . . " i d . at 2-3 
In response, Petitioner argues that the proffers were "consented to by the parties to expedite 
the matter and reduce the cost [because the] parties cannot afford a lengthy trial." See Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion for a New 
Trial," pp. 2-5 [hereinafter Objection to New Trial]. Petitioner also argues that no new exhibits were 
submitted "after trial" since any additional exhibits were admitted while the matter was still under 
advisement by the court, as evidenced by the fact that "Petitioner's Motion to Admit Additional 
Exhibits is still pending." Id. Finally, Petitioner argues that a new trial is unnecessary where simple 
amendment of the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to decide the omitted issues will 
suffice to remedy the flawed ruling, id. 
A. 15 
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In analysis of Respondent's first argument, although the Court concedes that "[a] proffer of 
evidence does not equate with testimony of an eyewitness," the Court also_ notes that ct[t]his is not to 
say that a proffer of testimony would be improper if that is the manner in which the party wishes to 
present its evidence . ." See State v Starnes. 841 P.2d 712, 715 n. 5 (Utah App 1992) Indeed, 
when parties "stipulate" to the introduction of oral testimony in the form of a proffer by an attorney, 
such testimony becomes valid evidence upon which a court is entitled to rule. C£ Utah R. Juv P 
43(b)(holding that: "[a]ll oral testimony before the court shall be given under oath unless waived by the 
parties, and may be narrative in form or by stipulated proffer of testimony or as otherwise provided by 
these Rules). In the present case, the Court record reflects that the proffered testimony was received 
by the court by way of stipulation of the parties. See Court Video Record, Tape No 990038, Count 
9:15. Consequently, it is apparent to the Court that an irregularity in the proceedings did not result 
from the proffered testimony received by the Court. 
In analysis of Respondents second argument, the Court relies on the ruling of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Crellin v Thomas. 247 P 2d 264 (Utah 1952) which directs that *w[a] wide 
discretion is reposed in the trial court in granting or denying a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence," and that "the exercise of [such] discretion must be based on a showing of 
substantial material evidence, from which it appears there is at least a reasonable likelihood that it 
would affect the result in a new trial." Id. at 265. In so exercising its discretion, this Court finds that 
it does not appear that the so-called "new evidence" presented by the parties is either "substantially 
material," or that it would materially "affect the result in a new trial." Id Furthermore, the Court 
finds some merit in Petitioner's arguments that the exhibits filed after the trial date cannot genuinely be 
considered "new evidence" since the matter had been taken under submission by the Court at the time 
the Motion to Admit Addition Exhibits was filed on Mar. 5, 1999. See Motion to Admit Additional 
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Exhibits, pp. 1-2; see also Court Minutes, Feb. 4, 1999 Though the trial itself had ended, the ultimate 
disposition of the case was still open. Moreover, the Court record indicates that the Order Admitting 
Additional Exhibits was signed by the Court on Apr. 15, 1999, one day prior to signing the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, on Apr. 16, 1999. See Order Admitting Additional Exhibits, p 2, 
compare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 7. Under such circumstances, the Court is not 
convinced that the late-submitted exhibits should be classifiable as "new evidence" for purposes of 
Rule 59. Consequently, however, under either line of reasoning, the court can find no basis upon 
which to grant a new trial by reason of newly discovered evidence. 
In analysis of Respondent's third argument, the Court reflects upon the ruling of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Price-Orem Inv Co v Rollins. Brown & Gunnell. Inc . 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986) 
which directs that a trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial hinges on whether the original 
trial verdict is based upon "substantial competent evidence," or evidence which is "sufficient in amount 
and credibility that, when considered in connection with the other evidence and circumstances shown 
in the case, it would justify some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds acting fairly thereon, to 
believe it to the truth/' Id- at 58 (citing Utah State Road Commission v Steele Ranch, 533 P 2d 888, 
890 (Utah 1975)). In the present case, it is apparent to the Court that although partially incomplete, 
its original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were based on such "substantial competent 
evidence." In rendering its decision, the Court relied on the nearly 60 exhibits filed by the parties, as 
well as upon the proposed Findings filed separately by the parties shortly thereafter. Moreover, upon 
examination of this evidence, the Court is satisfied that the existing record is certainly ''sufficient in 
amount and credibility" to support its Apr. 16, 1999 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well 
as the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed in conjunction with this Ruling. 





As a final note, the Court echoes the comments of Petioner and states that although the Court 
did neglect to rule on the $11,000 Mountain America Construction loan, and also failed to classify the 
parties property into marital and non-marital categories, it seems that the proper remedy is not to hold 
the entire trial anew, as Respondent proposes, but rather to simply amend the previous Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to correct the Courts previous error. The existing evidence is sufficient 
to support such revision, without imposing the unnecessary burden of a new trial. 
2. Motion to Amend 
As indicated above, Petitioner argues that the Court's original Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ought to be amended because "the Court failed to rule upon all the material issues 
that were submitted to the Court for decision as is required by law " See Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 2-5 
[hereinafter Amendment Support Memo]. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Court failed to 
enter a finding on the "$11,000 00 Mountain America obligation that arose out of costs to improve the 
Diamond Valley Lot (i.e., basement and culvert)." Id. Petitioner also asks for $1,500 in additional 
compensation for "cigarette burns" in the seat of the 1989 Ford Dually, which Petitioner argues were 
"intentionally" made by Respondent. 
In response, Respondent "agrees that the Court failed to rule on the $11,000.00 Mountain 
Ajnerica obligation." See Respondent's Objection to Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, pp. 1-6 [hereinafter Objection to Amendment] Respondent adds that "[t]he 
Court also failed to rule on what assets were premarital," as well as what assets were marital Id. In 
addition, Respondent protests the Court's refusal to rule on the tax lien issue for lack of "requisite 
evidence." See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 5. Finally, Respondent also argues that 
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tc[b]ecause there is no evidence in front of the Court with regard to the cost to repair the seat, the 
same should be denied. I[t] is also the position of the respondent that said request has already been 
made and denied in the [] OSC hearing held by the Court." £e£ Objection to Amendment, p. 5. 
In analysis of the parties arguments, and after a careful review of the record, the Court is 
satisfied that it did indeed fail to enter findings regarding the proper division of the $11,000 Mountain 
America Obligation. Moreover, after a careful review of Utah law, the Court also concedes that it 
failed to differentiate between premarital and marital property, or "make [complete] findings as to the 
source of disputed properties, [or] whether the assets used to acquire the properties had been 
commingled." See Haumont v. Haumonl 793 P.2d 421, 424-425 (Utah App. 1990). On the other 
hand, a careful review of the record appears to substantiate the Court's earlier conclusion that there is 
inadequate evidence upon which to enter a judgment in favor of either party regarding the tax lien 
issue Likewise, there is also inadequate evidence to justify amending the existing findings to award 
repair costs for the damaged Dually seat. 
Consequently, although a limited amendment of the Original Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law does appear appropriate for the specific purpose of determining marital and pre-marital 
property, and also for determining which party must bear the cost of the $1 1,000 Mountain America 
debt, it does not appear that amendment of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is appropriate 
for the purpose of addressing the tax lien and cigarette burn issues, based on the "inadequacy" of the 





On the basis of the foregoing, Respondent Patricia D. Bowen's Motion for a New Trial is 
hereby denied. However, Petitioner's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is 
granted in part, and denied in part, as set forth above. 
Counsel for Petitioner is hereby directed to prepare a Final Decree of Divorce in keeping with 
the terms of the Court's Apr. 16, 1999 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as the 
Court's present Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and submit it to Counsel for 
Respondent for approval as to form prior within 15 days of the date hereof, prior to submission to the 
Court for signature. 
m Dated this / ^ 7 day of October, 1999 
JANflBSrC. SHUMATE 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this ) Z? day of October, 1999 I provided true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RULING to each of the persons named below by placing a copy in the United States 
Mail first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
James E. Slemboski 
POBox 1717 
St. George UT 84771 
Ronald L. Read 
187N 100 W 
St. Georye UT 84770 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN EARL BOWEN, 
Petitioner, 
PATRICIA D. BOWEN, 
Respondent. 
AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 984500349 
Judge James L. Shumate 
In its concurrent Ruling on Petitioner Steven Earl Bowen's "Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law," the Court granted Petitioner's motion in part, and denied it in part, 
holding that "after a careful review of the record the Court is satisfied that it did indeed fail to enter 
findings regarding the proper division of the $11,000 Mountain American obligation. Moreover, 
after a careful review of Utah law, the Court also concedes that it failed to differentiate between [the 
parties'] premarital and marital property " See Ruling, p. 7. 
Therefore, in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b), the Court hereby amends paragraph 10 of 
its Apr. 16, 1999 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows, incorporating by reference 
herein all of the other provisions of those previous Findings: 
A 22 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
10(a). Petitioner's Premarital Property: The Court finds the premarital assets and liabilities 
belonging to Petitioner to be as follows: 
1990 utility trailer 
Army trailer 
First Security Bank checking account 
Tools listed in Exhibit A of Bowen Complaint 




10(b). Respondent's Premarital Property: The Court finds the premarital assets and liabilities 
belonging to Respondent to be as follows: 
Mountain America checking account 
Mountain America credit card debt 
Advanta credit card debt 




Diamond Valley lot and home 
Household furnishings, appliances & equipment 
10(c). Marital Property: The Court finds the joint marital assets and liabilities of both 
parties—established through the commingling of assets, as well as mutual domestic contributions 
made by both parties freeing one another to pursue economic gain—to be as follows: 
Mountain America Construction Loan $ (-11,000) 
1989 Ford Duely $ 9t500 
1993 Ford Pickup $ 3,500 
1985 Ford Pickup $ 3,500 
1994 Mercury $ 3,000 
Winchester Hills lot $ 55,000 
Net Total: $ 63.500 
10(d) Equitable Distribution of Marital property: The Court finds that the marital assets and 




Winchester Hills lot $ 55,000 
1989 Ford Dually Truck $ 9,500 
1993 Ford Pickup $ 3,500 
Mountain America Construction Loan $ (-11.000) 
Net Total $57,000 
RESPONDENT 
1985 Ford Pickup $ 3,500 
1994 Mercury $ 6.000 
Net Total $ 9,500 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Counsel for Petitioner is hereby directed to prepare a Final Decree of Divorce in keeping with 
the terms of the Court's April 16, 1999 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as the 
Court's present Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and submit it to Counsel 
for Respondent for approval as to form within 15 days of the date hereof, prior to submission to the 
Court for signature. 
m Dated this / W day of October, 1999. 
JAME5-L. SHUMATE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this \7 day of October, 19991 provided true and correct copies of the 
foregoing AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each of 
the attorneys named below by placing a copy in the United States Mail first-class postage prepaid, 
and addressed as follows: 
James E. Slemboski 
PO Box 1717 
St. George UT 84771 
Ronald L. Read 
187 N 100 W 
St. George UT 84770 
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t/fb 
RONALD L. READ (Bar No. 5784) 
HUGHES & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Respondent 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 . ^-jT. 
Telephone: (435) 67 3-fl8 92.k7"' H/t/O 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN EARL BOWEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
PATRICIA D. BOWEN, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW and AMENDMENT TO 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 984500349 DA 
Judge James L. Shumate 
The Respondent, Patricia D. Bowen, hereby submits her 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of her Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amendment to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in accordance with Rule 
52(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration as follows: 
Introduction 
This case came up for trial before the Fifth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding, on February 4, 1999. The 
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Court granted Petitioner's motion to bifurcate, reserving the 
issues of support, property division and debt allocation, and 
attorney's fees for determination at trial. The Court heard the 
evidence proffered by the parties and admitted the same as well 
as exhibits from each of the parties. 
Counsel for the parties submitted proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on or about the 5th day of March, 
1999. The Court rendered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on or about April 16, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion to 
Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Respondent filed a Motion for a New Trial. The Court entered a 
ruling denying the Respondent's Motion for a New Trial and 
Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on or about 
October 15, 1999. The Court entered a Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce on the 16th day of November, 1999. 
The Respondent disagrees with some aspects of the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amendment to Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the corresponding provisions 
in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce. Respondent does not wish 
to retry the entire case, but certain elements of the Court's 
decision either need further clarification or contravene the 
undisputed evidence presented and received by the Court. 
Therefore, Respondent respectfully brings this motion requesting 
the Court to review certain aspects of its decisions, and amend 
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the findings of fact and conclusions of law and Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce accordingly. 
Statement of Facts 
1. The undisputed facts with regard to the Chase Credit 
Card debt are as follows: 
a. The Chase Credit Card debt was incurred by the 
Petitioner within thirty days of the parties separation when the 
Petitioner purchased tools from Harbor Freight Tools, a cash 
advance at First Security Bank, a construction seminar in Salt 
Lake City, an obligation to Dixie fastening Systems, an 
obligation to Western Rock Products, an obligation to the Pipe 
Connection, and an obligation to Beehive Rental & Sales. See 
Exhibit 43. Neither the Respondent or the marital estate 
received a benefit from said charges by the Petitioner. 
b. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 16, 1999, the Court allocated the debt to the 
Petitioner. See Paragraph 10, April 16, 1999, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
c. In the Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 15, 1999, the Court reallocated 
the debt to the Respondent as a premarital obligation. See 
Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, October 15, 
1999, Paragraph 10(b). The evidence before the Court however was 
that the premarital credit card obligations of the Respondent 
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were paici off with monies from the November/December 1995 
refinance. See Exhibit 27. 
2. The undisputed evidence with regard to the Advanta 
Credit Card debt is as follows: 
a. The Advanta Credit Card debt was incurred by the 
Petitioner within sixty days of the parties separation when the 
Petitioner used the card for a cash advance from First Security 
Bank, a construction seminar in Salt Lake City, and an obligation 
to the National Assessment Instituted. The same was purchased on 
an AT&T credit card which was rolled into the Advanta Credit 
Card. See Exhibit 44. Neither the Respondent or the marital 
estate received a benefit from said charges by the Petitioner. 
b. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 16, 1999, the Court allocated the debt to the 
Petitioner. See Paragraph 10, April 16, 1999, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
c. In the Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 15, 1999, the Court reallocated 
the debt to the Respondent as a premarital obligation. See 
Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, October 15, 
1999, Paragraph 10(b). The evidence before the Court however was 
that the premarital credit card obligations of the Respondent 
were paid off with monies from the November/December 1995 
refinance. See Exhibit 27. 
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3. It is undisputed that the facts regarding the Mountain 
America Credit Card debt are as follows: 
a. The Mountain America Credit Card debt was incurred 
by the parties as a cash advance in the early part of February, 
1998. See Exhibit 41. The same was used to make the mortgage 
payment on the Respondent's premarital home. However, Petitioner 
claimed the payment as a contribution from his checking account. 
See Exhibit 19, House at 8149 Diamond Valley Drive, Under the 
year 1998. and received credit by the Court for the payment. 
b. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 16, 1999, the Court allocated the debt to the 
Petitioner. See Paragraph 10, April 16, 1999, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
c. In the Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 15, 1999, the Court reallocated 
the debt to the Respondent as a premarital obligation. See 
Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, October 15, 
1999, Paragraph 10(b). 
4. The following facts are undisputed with regard to the 
woodburnmg stove : 
a. The woodburnmg stove was that it was purchased 
during the marriage with the proceeds of Respondent's refinancing 
of the premarital home in December of 1997. The woodburnmg 
stove was purchased for $1,200. See Exhibit 27. 
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b. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 16, 1999, the Court awards the woodburning stove to 
the Respondent. See Paragraph 10, April 16, 1999, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
c. In the Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 15, 1999, the Court awards the 
woodburning stove to the Petitioner as a premarital item. See 
Paragraph 10(a), October 15, 1999, Amendment to Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
5. The undisputed facts regarding the 1989 Ford Dually are 
as follows: 
a. The monies, $9,500, used to purchase the 1989 Ford 
Dually were the result of the December 1997 refinance of the 
Respondent's premarital home. See Exhibits 10, 27, 32, 33 and 
34. 
b. The Petitioner originally claimed the 1989 Ford 
Dually as his separate property because of an allegation that the 
Respondent gifted the same to him. However, at trial the 
Petitioner waived his gift argument with regard to the 1989 Ford 
Dually. 
c. In the Court's Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, dated October 15, 1999, the Court determined 
that the 1989 Ford Dually was a marital asset and awarded the 
same to the Petitioner. See Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
A. 31 6 
Conclusions of Law, October 15, 1999, Paragraph 10(c) and 10(d). 
d. At the same time the Court had previously ordered 
that the Respondent assume and pay the obligation for the 1989 
Ford Dually as it had accrued against the Respondent's premarital 
home. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 16, 
1999, Paragraph 11. 
6. The undisputed facts regarding the payoff of the 
Petitioner's premarital obligation on the 1993 Ford Pickup are as 
follows: 
a. At the time of the parties marriage the Petitioner 
owned the 1993 Ford Pickup and the same had a value of $5,500 and 
an obligation of $9,000; 
b. $6,371 of the loan was paid off from monies from the 
Respondent's refinance of the premarital home in December 1997. 
See Exhibit 27. 
c. The Court awarded the 1993 Ford Pickup to the 
Petitioner but the Respondent is paying the obligation on the 
1993 Ford Pickup as it a part of the Respondent's premarital home 
obligation. See Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, October 15, 1999, Paragraph 10(d) and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, April 16, 1999, Paragraph 11. 
7. The undisputed facts regarding the purchase of 
Winchester Hills Lot 127 are as follows: 
a. The Respondent purchased Winchester Hills Lot 127 
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for $39,000 and that the same was purchased in her name only. 
See Exhibits 28 and 31. 
b. The Respondent used $12,782.15 from the 
November/December 1995 refinance of her premarital home and 
$20,700.00 from the December 1997 refinance of her premarital 
home to purchase Winchester Hills Lot 127. See Exhibit 27. It 
is also undisputed that the $400 earnest money and a $2,500 
payment towards the Winchester Hills Lot 127 came from the 
Petitioner's checking account. The source of the funds in the 
Petitioner's checking account was never disclosed. 
c. The Respondent applied for a construction loan in 
her own name with Mountain America and was turned down due to her 
income. The Respondent and Petitioner then jointly applied for 
the construction loan and Mountain America granted the loan upon 
the condition that Winchester Hills Lot 127 was placed into both 
applicants names. The Respondent therefore issued a quit-claim 
deed from herself to her and the Petitioner on or about April 17, 
1998, less than 30 days prior to the parties separation. See 
Exhibits 13 and 14. 
d. The Court determined that Winchester Hills Lot 127 
was a marital asset and awarded the same to the Petitioner. See 
Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, October 15, 
1999, Paragraph 10(c) and 10(d). 
e. At the same time the Court had previously ordered 
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that the Respondent assume and pay the obligation for Winchester 
Hills Lot 127 as it had accrued against the Respondent's 
premarital home. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
April 16, 1999, Paragraph 11. 
8. The Court's Amendment to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law state that the Petitioner was to pay the 
$11,000 obligation to Mountain America for the Construction Loan. 
See Amendment to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, October 
16, 1999, Paragraph 10(d). However, the order submitted by the 
Petitioner states that the Petitioner "shall be obligated to pay 
any outstanding balance that exists on the Mountain America 
Construction loan. Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 7. 
The Petitioner was aware at the time that he submitted the 
proposed supplemental decree that the Respondent has paid the 
balance of the Mountain America Construction loan to 
approximately $3,000. 
9. The Petitioner, aware that the Respondent had paid the 
balance down to less than $2,000, in drafting the Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce, ordered that the Petitioner only be obligated 
to pay any outstanding balance that exists on the Mountain 
America Construction Loan. See Supplemental Decree of Divorce, 
November 16, 1999, Paragraph 7. 
10. The undisputed evidence shows that each of the parties 
had the following premarital assets and debts: 
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a. Petitioner: 
i. 1993 Ford Pickup (value $5,500, obligation 
$9,000) 
ii. Construction tools (no value)1 
iii. Personal property (no value) 
iv. IRS tax obligation ($43,329.58) 
Petitioner therefore had a negative net worth of a 
($46,829.58). Without the IRS obligation the Petitioner would 
have a negative net worth of ($3,500). 
b. Respondent: 
i. Diamond Valley Home (value $164,000, 
obligation $30,000) 
ii. Corvette (value $8,000) 
iii. 1991 Chrysler (no value) 
iv. Personal property (no value) 
v. Furnishings (no value) 
Respondent therefore had a net worth of $142,000. 
11. The current division of assets and allocation of debt 
would place the parties at the time of the divorce with the 
following net worth: 
a. Petitioner: Net worth of $60,200 for a positive 
change, without the IRS obligation, of $63,700. 
i. 1993 Ford Pickup (value $3,500) 
'No value was placed on the construction tools or the personal property of the Petitioner, 
or for the 1991 Chrysler, personal property or household furnishings of the Respondent because 
the items were premarital and the parties retained them. The only two furnishings purchased 
during the marriage were the woodburning stove and a television which are included in the 
current net worth calculations. The evidence at trial is that the Petitioner actually benefitted from 
the marriage to the tune of $6,967.75 in additional tools purchased during the marriage and the 
source of the monies was again the proceeds from the Respondent's refinance. See Exhibit 27. 
As with the other items awarded to the Petitioner, the Respondent is paying the obligation as she 
is paying the refinance to which the Respondent is paying the obligation on. 
A. 35 10 
ii. 1989 Ford Dually (value $9f500) 
iii. Winchester Hills Lot (value ($55f000) 
iv. Construction tools (no value) 
v. Personal property (no value) 
vi. Saddle (value $2,000) 
vii. Woodburning Stove (value $1,200) 
viii. Mountain America Construction Loan 
(obligation $11,000) 
b. Respondent: Net worth of $88,825 for a negative 
change in her net worth of ($53,175). 
i. Diamond Valley Home (value $185,000, 
obligation $140,000) 
ii. Personal property (no value) 
iii. Furnishings (no value) 
iv. Television (value $600) 
v. 1985 Ford Pickup (value $3,500) 
vi. 1994 Mercury (value $6,000) 
vii. Credit Card Obligations (obligation $5,150) 
viii. Student loan (obligation $6,125) 
ix. Diamond Valley Lot (value $45,000) 
The financial difference that the two year marriage had on the 
parties was therefore $116,875 (Petitioner's gain in his net 
worth of $63,700 plus the Respondent's loss in her net worth of 
$53,175) . 
Argument 
The Respondent respectfully requests that the Court review 
the following aspects of its division of assets and allocation of 
debt in light of the mandate under Utah law that each party 
should be awarded their separate property and that the division 
of marital assets and allocation of marital debts be equitable. 
Respondent does not believe that the current division of marital 
assets and allocation of marital debt results in a fair, just 
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and/or equitable result. See Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann., 
Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990); Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 
(Utah App. 1990); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988); 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); and Newmever v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). 
I. Chase Credit Card Debt 
The undisputed evidence is that the Petitioner used the 
Chase Credit Card for his personal gain within 30 days of the 
parties separation. The Court correctly held that the Petitioner 
therefore was obligated to assume and pay the obligation. 
However, the Court in its amended findings of fact changed its 
ruling and found that the Respondent should assume and pay the 
obligation as a premarital debt. There is no evidence before the 
Court to support the Court's change in position. 
The Respondent therefore requests that the Court rule 
according to the undisputed evidence that the Chase Credit Card 
obligation was incurred during the marriage and that the 
Petitioner is the only one who derived benefit from the charges 
and therefore should be obligated to pay the same as his separate 
debt. 
II. Advanta Credit Card Debt 
The undisputed evidence before the Court is that the 
Petitioner used the Advanta Credit Card for his sole benefit 
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within 60 days prior to the parties separation. The Court 
correctly held that the Petitioner was therefore obligated to pay 
said obligation. However, the Court changed its ruling in the 
amended findings of fact and held that the Advanta Credit Card 
obligation was the premarital obligation of the Respondent and 
ordered that she should assume and pay said obligation. Again, 
there is no evidence before the Court to support the change in 
position. 
The Respondent would therefore respectfully request that the 
Court follow the undisputed evidence and find that the Advanta 
Credit Card obligation was incurred during the marriage but that 
the Petitioner is the only one who benefitted from said charges. 
Therefore, the Court should allocate the Advanta Credit Card 
obligation to the Petitioner as his separate obligation. 
Ill. Mountain America Credit Card Debt 
It is undisputed that the Mountain America Credit Card 
obligation was incurred during the parties marriage when they 
took a cash advance and used the same to make the house payment 
on the Respondent's premarital home. It is also undisputed that 
the Petitioner claimed that he had made the February 1998 payment 
on the Respondent's premarital home. The Court correctly held 
that the Petitioner was therefore obligated to pay said 
obligation. However, the Court changed its ruling in the amended 
findings of fact and held that the Mountain America Credit Card 
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obligation was the premarital obligation of the Respondent and 
ordered that she should assume and pay said obligation. Again, 
there is no evidence before the Court to support the change in 
position. 
Respondent therefore again respectfully requests that the 
Court find that the Mountain America Credit Card obligation was 
incurred during the marriage, that the same was used by the 
Petitioner to make the monthly house payment and that he claimed 
and received credit for said payment. Therefore, the Petitioner 
should assume the obligation and hold the Respondent harmless. 
IV. Woodburning Stove 
The undisputed evidence is that the woodburning stove was 
purchased during the marriage with monies from the refinance of 
the Respondent's premarital home. The Respondent is paying the 
obligation by the Court's order that she pay the obligation 
associated with the premarital home. 
The Respondent requests that the Court amend its findings to 
reflect that the woodburning stove is a marital asset and award 
the same to the Respondent as she is paying the associated 
obligation or in the alternative and consistent with the finding 
that the woodburning stove is a marital find that the associated 
obligation is also a marital debt and allocate the marital debt 
associated with the purchase of the wood stove to the Petitioner, 
the one who the asset is being awarded to. To do this the Court 
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should have the Petitioner assume an amount equal to the purchase 
price of the woodburning stove of the Respondent's^obligation on 
the premarital home. 
The alternative would be to find that the woodburning stove 
is the separate property of the Respondent as the monies used to 
purchase the same were from the refinance of the Respondent's 
premarital home and the Respondent is paying the woodburning 
stove obligation. 
V. 1989 Ford Dually 
The undisputed evidence is that the 1989 Ford Dually was 
purchased during the marriage with monies from the refinance of 
the Respondent's premarital home. The purchase price was $9,500. 
The Court determined that the 1989 Ford Dually is a marital asset 
and awarded the same to the Petitioner. However, the Respondent 
was ordered to pay the obligation for the 1989 Ford Dually 
pursuant to the Court's order that she pay the obligation 
associated with the premarital home. 
The Respondent requests that the Court amend its findings to 
reflect that the 1989 Ford Dually is the separate property of the 
Respondent having been obtained by the refinance of the 
premarital home and the Respondent is paying the associated 
obligation. In the alternative, the Respondent requests that the 
Court in finding that the 1989 Ford Dually is a marital asset and 
awarding the same to the Petitioner, the Court should also find 
A. 40 
15 
that the associated obligation is a marital debt and allocate the 
obligation associated with the 1989 Ford Dually to the 
Petitioner. The Petitioner would therefore assume and be 
responsible to pay $9,500 of the Respondent's obligation on the 
premarital home. 
VI. 1993 Ford Pickup 
The undisputed evidence is that the 1993 Ford Pickup was the 
premarital property of the Petitioner and at the time of the 
marriage the value of the 1993 Ford Pickup was $5,500 and the 
obligation was $9,000. Therefore the 1993 Ford Pickup had a 
negative equity of $3,500 when the parties married. The 
undisputed evidence is also that the loan on the 1993 Ford Pickup 
was paid off by monies from the December 1997 refinance of the 
I 
Respondent's marital home in the amount of $6,371. The 1993 Ford 
Pickup was awarded to the Petitioner as a marital asset but again 
the Respondent was ordered to pay the associated marital 
obligation by paying the $6,371 as part of the Court's order that 
she pay the obligation on her premarital home. 
The Respondent requests that the Court amend its findings 
with regard to the obligation and allocate the $6,371 which paid 
the loan balance on the 1993 Ford Pickup to the Petitioner. The 
Petitioner would therefore assume and be responsible to pay 
$6,371 of the Respondent's obligation on the premarital home. 
16 
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VII. Winchester Hills Lot 
The undisputed facts with regard to the Winchester Hills Lot 
are that it was purchased during the marriage with $2,900 coming 
from the Petitioner's bank account, with the source of the monies 
unknown, $12,782.15 of the purchase price coming from the 
December 1995 refinance of the Respondent's premarital home, and 
$20,700 of the purchase price coming from the December 1997 
refinance of the Respondent's premarital home. The lot was 
purchased in the name of the Respondent only and title was quit 
claimed less than thirty days prior to the parties separation^as 
a condition of obtaining a construction loaiv. The Court awarded 
the Lot to the Petitioner as a marital asset yet again left the 
associated obligation of $34,482.15 for the Respondent to pay as 
a part of the obligation of her premarital home. 
Respondent requests that the Court either order that the 
Petitioner assume $34,482.15 of the obligation on her premarital 
home or in the alternative order that the lot be awarded to the 
Respondent as her separate property as the monies used to 
purchase the lot are traceable to her premarital property. In 
that situation it would only be fair and equitable for the 
Respondent to be ordered to pay the Petitioner his contribution 
of $2,900. 
VIII. Mountain America Construction loan 
Respondent simply requests clarification of Paragraph 7 of 
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the Supplemental Decree of Divorce that the same be consistent 
with the Court's ruling. The Petitioner should be ordered to pay 
the $11,000 as ordered by the Court and repay any amounts the 
Respondent has paid in the interim. The only logical alternative 
would be to have the amount that the Petitioner is ordered to pay 
be determined as of the date of the parties divorce decree. 
Again, any amounts paid by the Respondent since that date should 
be reimbursed or credited in some other fashion. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Respondent respectfully requests the 
relief sought above. It is the position of jthe respondent with 
regard to the obligations set forth as I-III that the same were 
incurred during the parties marriage, that the Respondent did not 
receive any benefit from the same, and therefore the obligations 
clearly are not premarital, but marital and should be paid by the 
Petitioner as he is the one who received the benefit. 
It is the position of the Respondent with regard to the 
assets set forth as IV-VTI that the obligations should follow the 
asset. Equity nor fairness are met where the Petitioner receives 
the asset free and clear while the Respondent pays the associated 
obligation because the asset was purchased with proceeds from the 
refinance. If the obligation is not allocated to the person 
I 
awarded the asset, then the asset should be deemed the 
Respondent's separate property as the monies used to purchase the 
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woodburning stove, the 1989 Ford Dually, the 1993 Ford Pickup, 
and Winchester Hills Lot 127 are traceable to the Respondent's 
separate property, the premarital home. 
With regard to the Mountain America Construction loan, the 
Respondent simply wants the order clarified as to either the 
amount of $11,000, as specifically ordered by the Court, or 
whatever amount was due as of the date of the divorce decree, the 
date the Court is to look at assets and obligations. Because the 
Respondent has paid said obligation down to approximately $650, 
the Petitioner should be obligated to repay Respondent. 
If the Court agrees that the obligations should be assumed 
by the Petitioner, the Respondent asks that the Petitioner be 
ordered to obtain a loan to reduce the balance of her obligation 
on the premarital home. Until such time as the loan is obtained 
by the Petitioner and the Respondent's obligation reduced on the 
premarital home, the Respondent would request contribution 
towards the obligation in the amount of.$600 per month. If the 
Petitioner fails to obtain a loan within six months of the 
Court's order, the assets themselves should be ordered returned 
to the Respondent in the same condition they were at the time of 
trial and the Respondent should be ordered to assume all of the 




Dated this / day of December, 1999 
RONALD L. REAT>, for 
HUGHES & ASSOCIATES 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, was mailed to the 
following on the / day of December, 1999. 
James E. Slemboski 
Slemboski & Hutchinson 
32 East 100 South, Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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RONALD L. READ (Bar No. 5784) 
HUGHES & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Respondent 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-4892 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN EARL BOWEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
PATRICIA D. BOWEN, 
Respondent, 
ORDER 
Case No. 984500349 DA 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court on Respondent's Motion 
to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf the Court having 
reviewed the files and record in this case and having heard 
argument of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1(. The Respondent's request that the credit card 
obligations as of the date of the parties divorce, i.e., Chase 
Credit Card, Advanta Credit Card, and Mountain America Credit 
Cared/ be deemed marital obligations is denied and the same will 
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remain the premarital obligation of the Respondent; 
2. The Respondent's request that the Woodburning Stove 
be deemed marital and the same be awarded to the Respondent as she 
is paying the obligation associated therewith is granted in part 
and denied in part. The Woodburning is a marital asset but the 
same will be awarded to the Petitioner. 
3. The Respondent's request that the 1989 Ford Dually be 
deemed her separate property as the funds used to purchase the same 
are traceable to the refinance of her separate premarital home and 
the Respondent is paying said obligation, or in the alternative 
that it is a marital asset and the Petitioner should pay the 
corresponding obligation is denied. 
4. The Respondent's request that the 1993 Ford Pickup's 
obligation of $6,371 be deemed marital and allocate the same to the 
Petitioner as he was awarded the 1993 Ford Pickup is denied. 
5. The Respondent's request that the Winchester Hills 
lot be deemed her separate property as the funds used to purchase 
the same are traceable to the refinance of her separate premarital 
home and the Respondent is paying said obligation, or in the 
alternative that it is a marital asset and the Petitioner should 
pay the corresponding obligation is denied. 
6. The Respondent's request that the Mountain America 
Construction loan allocation be clarified is hereby granted, and 
the Petitioner is ordered to pay the amount of the Mountain America 
2 
A. 48 
Construction loan outstanding at the time of the parties divorce, 
DATED this / day of ftpri-1/2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
J^Qge James L. Shumate 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
James E. Slemboski 
Attorney for Respondent 
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